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Abstract 
Many developing countries obtain a large share of their income from the exploitation of open-access 
common-property renewable natural resources. Imperfect or lack of property rights for these resources 
results in the partial or non-internalization of negative externalities.  Analysis of this problem has 
focused on “low” congestion situations and has neglected the more important congestion categories 
where average and marginal cost schedules are backward-bending and welfare losses are significantly 
greater. This paper analyses two such categories, “high” and “super” congestion, and examines the 
impact of open access on steady-state welfare, natural resources, employment, output and prices in a 
general equilibrium model. It finds that greater congestion increases welfare costs, with trade further – 
and always – reducing an open-access exporter’s resources and welfare. An optimal tax raises price and 
reduces output under autarky in the case of low or high congestion but reduces price and raises output 
under super congestion, with significantly larger gains. The effects of trade between an open-access 
developing country and a regulated but otherwise identical partner country is very dependent on the 
degree of congestion. Trade between two open-access countries with different externality (population) 
levels raises global output and welfare, improves global efficiency of resource use and reduces 
international inequality. Welfare gains from emigration is much larger in super congestion situations, 
especially if migration results in low congestion.  
Keywords 
Open Access, natural resource, unexamined high congestion, autarky and trade, aquaculture. 
JEL codes: D62, F18, Q22, Q27, Q56 
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1. Introduction* 
Many developing countries obtain a large share of their income from the exploitation of open-access 
common-property renewable natural resources (NR), including fisheries, forests, arable land, grazing 
grounds, and water resources. Imperfect or lack of property rights for the NR results in the partial or 
non-internalization of negative externalities,1 an excessive use of labor and other variable inputs and NR 
degradation. This problem has affected many developing countries and has led to the decline or 
disappearance of communities due to rapid population growth, access to a wider market, and more. For 
instance, Brander and Taylor (1998) argue that open access to a rich resource base led to economic 
growth, population overshooting and the disappearance of Easter Island’s forests, with a dramatic 
decline in population and well-being over time.  
The classic case of NR depletion is that of fisheries, which has affected a large number of countries 
over time. Early studies of NR depletion focused on this issue (e.g., Gordon 1954, Scott 1955). This 
paper selects aquaculture, or fish farming, to illustrate the problem examined as the sector’s output has 
grown extremely rapidly in recent years – from about a third in 2005 to over 50 percent of global fish 
output in 2015 (FAO 2016) – and so have the associated negative externalities. The analysis is directly 
applicable to a number of other NR and non-NR cases (see Section 5).  
Given farm fishing’s recent growth, it is no surprise that most analyses to date have focused on wild 
fishing. Models designed to explain the evolution of the stock of wild fish (and other renewable NRs) 
have typically included equations for the stock’s natural and actual growth, i.e., natural growth minus 
harvest. Farmed fish requires a different model as the fish fry is produced in hatcheries and nurseries 
and its supply is essentially independent of fishing intensity, as is the size of the production area and 
water volume or NR quantity. On the other hand, NR quality declines with fishing intensity or density 
of variable inputs (e.g., pens, labor). Excessive farm fishing intensity generates two types of problems, 
namely low quality and hence low productivity of the NR, and greater volatility due to the rapid spread 
of a negative shock to one unit (e.g., a disease) to the rest of the industry. Such problems are common 
in many farm fishing countries. Examples provided here draw on the industry’s experience in Chile and 
the Philippines.  
Open access and a lack of regulations has led to an excessively high density of pens in the case of 
Chilean salmon. This resulted in a parasite and disease outbreak in 2008. The parasite spread rapidly 
across the industry and destroyed two thirds of the output through 2009 and 2010. The episode led to a 
number of regulatory changes, though the sector has continued to be plagued by frequent problems 
(Anderson 2012). The excessive pen density has also led to high pollution levels and lower productivity 
in the industry. 2  
A similar problem has been found in various parts of the Philippines. For instance, Yambot (2000) 
examined tilapia farms in Lake Taal and found high congestion of fish cages, as well as high stocking 
density and feeding rates. These resulted in extremely high levels of ammonia and nitrogen and very 
low levels of dissolved oxygen, with high pollution levels and widespread waste materials, and floating 
dead fish abounding due to mass mortality, all of which have led to chronic disease of the surviving fish. 
                                                     
* I would like to thank Mario Niklitschek and participants in the 2017 Conference of the Society of Government Economists 
and a World Bank seminar for their useful comments. 
1 For instance, López (1997, 1998) finds that the share of the negative NR externalities – from the use of village-level 
common-property lands in Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire – that is internalized is around 30 percent and declines with village 
size.  
2 Lack of effective vaccine against the SRS bacteria in coastal waters affecting salmon has led Chile to use more antibiotics 
than Norway, Scotland and British Columbia combined, as well as a use of pesticides that is a high multiple of that of 
British Columbia (Bridsen 2014).  
Maurice Schiff 
2 Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Working Papers 
Similar problems occurred in the coastal waters of the islands of Luzon and Mindanao. Among the most 
dramatic events were a series of mass mortalities of milkfish in Bolinao, Pangasinan in 2002, with water 
quality and habitat degraded to a degree that severely diminished the likelihood of cultured fish survival 
and growth (Talaue-McManus 2006; San Diego-McGlone et al. 2008).  
Another problem is toxic algae bloom. The large amounts of nutrients in the case of high pen and 
stock density result in exponential algae growth, followed by an exhaustion of nutrients and a mass of 
decaying algae. The latter depletes the water’s oxygen by blocking the sun, which suffocates the fish, 
and its toxicity pollutes the water and poisons them. This has had a negative impact on farm fishing 
productivity in both Chile and the Philippines. An algae bloom in Chile led to a 16 percent decline in 
the 2015 salmon output (Bajak 2016) and in a 20 percent downward revision of the 2016 salmon and 
trout production forecasts (Guardian, March 6, 2016; Financial Times, May 5, 2016), and the problem 
was still affecting the industry in 2018 (www.undercurrentnews.com, Feb. 7, 2018). Algae bloom has 
also affected fisheries in Laguna de Bay, the Philippines’ largest lake. An Asian Development Bank 
(ADB 1989) report examined the situation in Laguna de Bay in order to assess the impact of its support 
of the development of milkfish pens and tilapia cages and found that tilapia and milkfish output had 
been badly affected by it.3 
1.1 Congestion  
This is, to my knowledge, the first study to introduce a taxonomy consisting of three economically-
relevant congestion categories, namely low (LC), high (HC) and super (SC) congestion. The study 
contributes to the literature by providing, under these three congestion categories and for both autarky 
and trade, a general-equilibrium analysis of the steady-state levels of NR, welfare, fishing intensity (or 
employment) and output in the case of open access to a NR relative to an optimally regulated one, and 
examining how results are affected by changes in the value of parameters of the preference and 
production functions and in their functional form. The analysis conducted here is directly applicable to 
other common-property resource cases (see Section 5).  
The three congestion categories are defined here and are explained in more detail in Section 2. First, 
LC (HC and SC) prevails on the upward-sloping (backward-bending) segment of the average cost or 𝐴𝐶 
curve, and equivalently, on the positive (negative) segment of the marginal cost or 𝑀𝐶 curve. Second, 
HC (SC) prevails on the lower (upper) part of the backward-bending segment of the 𝐴𝐶 curve, with the 
two separated by the 𝐴𝐶 curve’s inflection point, which – as shown in Figure 1 – is also where the 
(backward-bending part of the) 𝐴𝐶 curve and the (positive part of the) 𝑀𝐶 curve intersect.  
The distinction between HC and SC is important as open-access output 𝑄 is greater (smaller) than 
optimal output 𝑄∗ – i.e., 𝑄 > (<) 𝑄∗ – under HC (SC). The distinction between SC and HC is also 
important because of the opposite implications regarding the impact of trade policy. Moreover, SC holds 
over a significantly larger range of output and variable input (or employment) values than HC (see 
Section 2). As the welfare cost of open access to a NR is greater under HC than LC and is most severe 
under SC, one would have expected great interest in the HC and SC cases. Nevertheless, an exhaustive 
online search suggests the issue has not played an important role in the aquaculture literature where 
production studies have tended to focus on technical efficiency (e.g., Dey et al. 2000; Iliyasu et al. 2016). 
The backward-bending supply curve for wild fishing has been examined in a few partial-equilibrium 
studies, though some confusion persists regarding the analysis.4  
                                                     
3 A similar problem could also occur in the case of farm/land fish ponds (e.g., see Stephens 1998).  
4 The seminal article by Copes (1970) provides a graphical analysis of the issue for a closed economy in a partial-equilibrium 
setting. Clark (1990) refers to a discounted supply curve that might be backward bending in the case of an optimally 
managed fishery (see also Thuy and Flaaten (2013) who refer to these results). This is not possible as variable inputs’ 
marginal product at the optimum must be positive, i.e., the optimum must be on the upward-sloping segment of the 𝐴𝐶 
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An issue that has become of increasing concern in recent years and is also examined here is the 
impact of trade on the environment. A common argument is that international trade has led to an increase 
in environmental degradation in countries with imperfect property rights.5 Studies dealing with this issue 
in the case of trade in NR-based products – e.g., Chichilnisky (1994) and Copeland and Taylor (1994) – 
have typically examined it under LC conditions. In this paper, I show that, while this result holds not 
only under LC but also under HC, the opposite holds under SC.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets forth a two-sector general 
equilibrium model and preference function, and solves the model under unregulated (open- access) and 
regulated NR. Section 3 considers the autarky case and examines the implications of open access for 
steady-state welfare, NR, variable inputs and output, solves for the optimal tax, and examines the 
robustness of the results. Free trade is examined in Section 4. Sections 3 and 4 provide both a graphical 
and algebraic analysis, as well as a set of simulations. Section 5 examines applications of the analysis 
to other phenomena. Section 6 draws policy implications and Section 7 concludes.  
2. Model  
Section 2.1 presents the general equilibrium model’s supply side, including the production and cost 
functions, while Section 2.2 provides its demand side. The open-access and optimal solutions are 
presented in Section 2.3.  
2.1 Supply 
Assume an economy whose private sector produces two goods under perfect competition, a 
manufacturing good 𝑀 and a commodity 𝑄. The economy’s endowment of labor is denoted by 𝕃, and 
the amount employed in sector 𝑄 (𝑀) is denoted by 𝐿(𝑙), with 𝐿 + 𝑙 = 𝕃. Following Brander and Taylor 
(1998), I assume the manufacturing good 𝑀 is produced with 𝑙 under a constant-returns-to-scale 
technology. Thus, the marginal product in 𝑀, 𝑀𝑃𝑙, is constant. Units are chosen such that 𝑀𝑃𝑙 = 1, i.e., 
𝑀 = 𝑙 = 𝕃 − 𝐿. Good 𝑀 is chosen as the numéraire, with its price normalized to one. Thus, the price of 
the variable factor is 𝑤 = 𝑉𝑀𝑃𝐿 = 1.  
In the case of wild fishing, the natural resource (NR) or fish stock declines with fishing intensity, i.e., 
with the amount of variable inputs used. In the case of farm fishing (whether in coastal waters, lakes, 
rivers or pools), NR quantity – i.e., the area and amount of water available – is given, though its quality 
and productive impact is not.  
Assume for simplicity that operating a fish pen requires a fixed amount of labor, which is set equal 
to one. Fish farms may operate a single or multiple fish pens and NR quality declines with the number 
of pens or amount of labor, 𝐿, per unit of area, or with their density. The production function is 𝑄 =
𝐿𝑁(𝐿), 𝑁′ < 0, 𝑁′′ ≤ 0, where 𝑁 is NR quality (as well as 𝑄/𝐿, i.e., labor’s average product, 𝐴𝑃𝐿). 
Marginal product 𝑀𝑃𝐿 = 𝑁 + 𝐿𝑁
′ ≷ 0. Since 𝑤 = 1, 𝐴𝐶 = 1/𝐴𝑃𝐿 and 𝑀𝐶 = 1/𝑀𝑃𝐿. An open-access 
equilibrium where 𝑀𝐶 > (<) 0 is located on the upward-sloping (backward-bending) part of the 𝐴𝐶 
curve where low (high or super) congestion – i.e., LC (HC or SC) – prevails (see Figure 1).  
It is surprising that the backward-bending segment of the supply (𝐴𝐶) curve has not been a central 
part of analyses of open access to common-property resources. Given that it is the locus of the largest 
negative externalities and the greatest welfare cost, one would have expected it to be of major interest 
                                                     
curve. Gautam et al. (1996) find a backward-bending supply curve in wild fishing caused by a labor-leisure tradeoff rather 
than negative externalities.  
5 Based on their empirical analysis of sulfur dioxide concentrations from cities across the globe, Copeland and Taylor (2006) 
find that trade is good for the environment in the average country. An early survey of the literature is Dean (1992).  
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to policy analysts and policymakers. Writing about the backward-bending supply in the case of road 
travel, Thomps (1998) states: “… [it] is usually referred to … as “unstable” and ignored as irrelevant ...”  
Assume 𝑁 = 𝛼 − 𝛽𝐿 (𝛼, 𝛽 > 0), where 𝛼 is the NR endowment or NR quality in the absence of farm 
fishing. Then, production functions for 𝑄 and 𝑀 are given by:  
 
𝑄 = 𝐿𝑁 = 𝐿(𝛼 − 𝛽𝐿), 𝑀 = 𝑙 = 𝕃 − 𝐿;   𝛼, 𝛽 > 0, 𝐿 𝜖 (0,
𝛼
𝛽
)     (1) 
where 𝛽 reflects the negative externality, and 𝐿 < 𝛼/𝛽 ⇔ 𝑁 = 𝛼 − 𝛽𝐿 > 0.  
Thus, labor’s average product 𝐴𝑃𝐿 =
𝑄
𝐿
= 𝑁 = 𝛼 − 𝛽𝐿 > 0. With 𝑤 = 1, average cost 𝐴𝐶 =
1
𝐴𝑃𝐿
=
1
𝛼−𝛽𝐿
.6 Labor’s marginal product 𝑀𝑃𝐿 = 𝛼 − 2𝛽𝐿, and marginal cost 𝑀𝐶 =
1
𝑀𝑃𝐿
=
1
𝛼−2𝛽𝐿
. Denote 
maximum output – or 𝑁𝑅’s ‘carrying capacity’ – by ?̂? (𝑄𝑀𝐴𝑋 in Figure 1), with ?̂? =
𝛼2
4𝛽
, produced with 
?̂? =
𝛼
2𝛽
 where 𝑀𝑃𝐿 = 0. Also, 𝑀𝑃𝐿 and 𝑀𝐶 =
1
𝑀𝑃𝐿
 ≷ 0 for 𝐿 ≶ ?̂?, with lim
𝐿−→?̂?
𝑀𝐶  ( lim
𝐿+→?̂?
𝑀𝐶) =
∞ (−∞). In other words, and as shown in Figure 1, 𝑀𝐶 jumps from ∞ to −∞ as 𝐿 crosses ?̂? from 𝐿 < ?̂? 
to 𝐿 > ?̂? and 𝑀𝑃𝐿 changes from infinitesimally positive to zero to infinitesimally negative.  
Output 𝑄 is quadratic in 𝐿, i.e., it has two solutions, 𝐿1 and 𝐿2, with 𝑄 = 𝐿1𝑁1 = 𝐿2𝑁2. The solution 
is 𝐿1 =
𝛼
𝛽
− 𝐿2 or 𝐿1 + 𝐿2 =
𝛼
𝛽
, 7 with two possible outcomes: i) 𝐿1 = 𝐿2 = ?̂? =
𝛼
2𝛽
, 𝑁 = ?̂? = 𝛼 − 𝛽?̂? =
𝛼
2
, 𝑄 = ?̂?, or ii) 𝑄 < ?̂?, with output produced either with a low 𝐿2 < ?̂? and high 𝑁2 >
𝛼
2
 (in LC’s case) 
or with a high 𝐿1 > ?̂? and low 𝑁1 <
𝛼
2
 (HC or SC case), with the former (latter two) located on the 
upward-sloping (backward-bending) segment of the 𝐴𝐶 curve. This is depicted by points 𝐴 (LC) and 𝐴′ 
(SC) in Figure 1.  
The distinction between the HC and SC categories is important because of their implications for the 
welfare cost of open access. SC (HC) is defined as the segment of the backward-bending 𝐴𝐶 curve 
where optimal output, 𝑄∗, is greater (smaller) than open-access output, 𝑄. The fact that 𝑄 < 𝑄∗ under 
SC, i.e., that open-access output is smaller than optimal output, is one of the reasons why the welfare 
cost of open access is so high under SC, the other reason being the higher cost. And as we shall see, a 
number of opposite results obtain under the HC and SC congestion categories.  
I derive now the critical level of 𝐿, 𝐿𝐼, that separates the HC and SC categories. Denote variables 
under open access (optimal regulation) by subscript 1 (2). The point that separates SC from HC is where 
optimal output is equal to open-access output, i.e., where the 𝐴𝐶 curve intersects the (positive segment 
of the) 𝑀𝐶 curve. Thus, 𝐿𝐼 is the level of 𝐿 where 𝑄1 = 𝑄2, which occurs where 𝐴𝐶1 = 𝑀𝐶2, i.e., where 
1
𝛼−𝛽𝐿1
=
1
𝛼−2𝛽𝐿2
 or 𝐿1 = 2𝐿2. Since 𝐿1 =
𝛼
𝛽
− 𝐿2 (see footnote 8), we have 𝐿1 =
2𝛼
3𝛽
 and 𝐿2 =
𝛼
3𝛽
. As 𝐿𝐼 
separates HC and SC, it is located on the backward-bending segment of the 𝐴𝐶 curve, i.e., 𝐿𝐼 = 𝐿1 =
2𝛼
3𝛽
. Output 𝑄𝐼 can be produced with 𝐿𝐼 = 2𝛼/3𝛽 (and 𝑁1 = 𝛼 − 𝛽𝐿1 = 𝛼/3) or with 𝐿2 =
𝐿𝐼
2
= 𝛼/3𝛽 
                                                     
6 Labor is not the only costly input. Other ones are pens, fish fry and feed. One can reasonably assume that these are directly 
related to the amount of labor used, i.e., the per-unit cost would be 1 + 𝛾, where 𝛾 is the cost of pens and fish fry relative 
to the unitary wage rate, an element that can easily be incorporated in the analysis. For simplicity, and following Brander 
and Taylor (1998), I abstract from non-labor costs.  
7 With 𝑄 = 𝐿1𝑁1 = 𝐿2𝑁2, or 𝑄 = 𝐿1(𝛼 − 𝛽𝐿1) = 𝐿2(𝛼 − 𝛽𝐿2), we have 𝛽𝐿1
2 − 𝛼𝐿1 + 𝐿2(𝛼 − 𝛽𝐿2) = 0, with 𝐿1 = 
𝛼 ± √𝛼2−4𝛽𝐿2(𝛼−𝛽𝐿2)
2𝛽
=
𝛼 ± √(𝛼−2𝛽𝐿2)
2
2𝛽
=
𝛼 ± (𝛼−2𝛽𝐿2)
2𝛽
. We have two solutions, one for 𝐿1 ≠ 𝐿2 and one for 𝐿1 = 𝐿2, namely: 
i) 𝐿1 ≠ 𝐿2: 𝐿1 =
𝛼 + (𝛼−2𝛽𝐿2)
2𝛽
=
𝛼
𝛽
− 𝐿2, or 𝐿1 + 𝐿2 =
𝛼
𝛽
 ; and ii) 𝐿1 =
𝛼− (𝛼−2𝛽𝐿2)
2𝛽
= 𝐿2 =
𝛼
2𝛽
= ?̂?, with i) 𝑁1 = 𝛼 − 𝛽𝐿1 =
𝛽𝐿2, 𝑁2 = 𝛽𝐿1, 𝑁1 + 𝑁2 = 𝛼, 𝑁1 <
𝛼
2
 < 𝑁2; and ii) 𝑁1 = 𝑁2 =
𝛼
2
 , i.e., the NR level is equal to half the initial endowment, 
𝛼. 
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(and 𝑁2 = 2𝛼/3), i.e., it can be produced at the optimum at half the cost prevailing under open access, 
in terms of both variable inputs 𝐿 and natural resource 𝑁.  
Based on the solution for 𝐿 = ?̂? and 𝐿 = 𝐿𝐼, the three congestion categories’ definition is: 
 
Definition 1. LC: 0 < 𝐿 < ?̂? =
𝛼
2𝛽
; HC: ?̂? < 𝐿 < 𝐿𝐼 =
2𝛼
3𝛽
; and SC: 𝐿𝐼 < 𝐿 <
𝛼
𝛽
.  
The definition of these categories in terms of output 𝑄 = 𝐿(𝛼 − 𝛽𝐿) is:  
 
Definition 2. LC: 0 < 𝑄 < ?̂? =
𝛼2
4𝛽
; HC: 𝑄𝐼 =
2𝛼2
9𝛽
< 𝑄 < ?̂?; and SC: 0 < 𝑄 < 𝑄𝐼.  
Thus, the range of variable input values, 𝐿, is 
𝛼
6𝛽
 under HC, 
𝛼
3𝛽
 under SC and 
𝛼
2𝛽
 under LC. The range 
of output values, 𝑄, is 
𝛼2
36𝛽
 under HC, 
2𝛼2
9𝛽
 under SC and 
𝛼2
4𝛽
 under LC. Thus, in terms of 𝐿 (𝑄), the range 
of values under SC is twice (eight times) that under HC.8 And the range of values of 𝐿(𝑄) under LC is 
three (nine) times that under HC. 
Note that 𝐿I, which separates HC from SC, is also the inflection point on the backward-bending 
segment of the 𝐴𝐶 curve. As 𝐿 increases and 𝑄 declines, 𝐴𝐶 increases at an increasing (decreasing) rate 
under SC (HC), with 
𝜕2𝐴𝐶
𝜕𝑄2
< (>) 0. Thus, 𝐿𝐼 can also be obtained by solving 
𝜕2𝐴𝐶
𝜕𝑄2
= 0.9 
Finally, 𝑀𝐶1 < 0 is the mirror image of 𝑀𝐶2 > 0.
10 This is depicted in Figure 1. 
2.2 Demand 
Individual preferences are represented by a Cobb-Douglas utility function: 
𝑈 = 𝑚1/2𝑞1/2,           (2) 
where 𝑚 = 𝑀/𝕃 and 𝑞 = 𝑄/𝕃.  
3. Autarky 
Section 3.1 presents a graphical analysis, Section 3.2 provides the solution to the model, and Section 3.3 
presents various simulations. Welfare in Section 3.1 is aggregate welfare 𝑊 = 𝕃𝑈, while welfare in 
Sections 3.2 and 3.3 is the representative individual’s utility 𝑈, a distinction that matters when 
examining the impact of changes in 𝕃. 
                                                     
8 In term of 𝐿, the range of values under HC is 
2𝛼
3𝛽
−
𝛼
2𝛽
=
𝛼
6𝛽
, while the range of values under SC is 
𝛼
𝛽
−
2𝛼
3𝛽
=
𝛼
3𝛽
, or twice 
the range under HC. In terms of 𝑄, ?̂? =
𝛼2
4𝛽
 and 𝑄𝐼 =
2𝛼2
9𝛽
=
8
9
?̂?. Thus, the range of values under HC is ?̂? − 𝑄𝐼 =
1
9
?̂?. Under 
SC, the range of values is between 𝑄𝐼 =
8
9
?̂? and zero (for 𝐿 =
𝛼
𝛽
) or 
8
9
?̂?. Thus, the range of output values under SC is 8 
times the range of values under HC. 
9 Denoting 
𝜕𝐴𝐶
𝜕𝑄
 by 𝐴𝐶′ and 
𝜕2𝐴𝐶
𝜕𝑄2
 by 𝐴𝐶′′, 𝐴𝐶′ =
𝜕𝐴𝐶
𝜕𝐿
.
𝜕𝐿
𝜕𝑄
=
𝜕𝐴𝐶
𝜕𝐿
/
𝜕𝑄
𝜕𝐿
= 
𝛽
(𝛼−𝛽𝐿)2(𝛼−2𝛽𝐿)
≷ 0 ⇔ 𝛼 − 2𝛽𝐿 ≷ 0 ⇔ 𝐿 ≶ ?̂? =
𝛼
2𝛽
. 
As shown in Figure 1, the slope of the 𝐴𝐶 curve is positive (negative) in its LC (HC and SC) segment. The change in the 
slope is 𝐶′′ =
𝜕𝐴𝐶′
𝜕𝐿
/ 
𝜕𝑄
𝜕𝐿
=
2𝛽2(2𝛼−3𝛽𝐿)
(𝛼−𝛽𝐿)3(𝛼−2𝛽𝐿)3
. Thus, 𝐴𝐶′′ = 0 at 𝐿 = 𝐿𝐼 =
2𝛼
3𝛽
. Also, as 𝑄 increases: i) 𝐴𝐶′′ > 0 under LC 
(𝐿 < ?̂?), ii) 𝐴𝐶′′ < 0 under HC (?̂? < 𝐿 < 𝐿𝐼) and iii) 𝐴𝐶
′′ > 0 under SC (𝐿𝐼 < 𝐿 < 𝛼/𝛽).  
10 𝑀𝐶 under optimal regulation is 𝑀𝐶2 =
1
𝛼−2𝛽𝐿2
> 0, 𝐿2 < ?̂?. Thus, −𝑀𝐶2 =
1
2𝛽𝐿2−𝛼
< 0. 𝑀𝐶 under open access is 
𝑀𝐶1 =
1
𝛼−2𝛽𝐿1
< 0, 𝐿1 > ?̂?. At the same output, 𝐿2 =
𝛼
𝛽
− 𝐿1 (see fn. no. 8). Thus, 2𝛽𝐿2 − 𝛼 = 2𝛽 (
𝛼
𝛽
− 𝐿1) − 𝛼 =
𝛼 − 2𝛽𝐿1, i.e., 𝑀𝐶1 = −𝑀𝐶2. In other words, 𝑀𝐶1 is the mirror image of 𝑀𝐶2.  
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3.1 Graphical analysis 
Assume first that a country’s demand for 𝑄 is represented by line 𝐷 in Figure 1. Open-access equilibrium 
is at point 𝐴 – which is located in the LC segment of the 𝐴𝐶 curve – and output is 𝑄0. The optimum is 
at point E where output is 𝑄1. The welfare cost under open access is ∆𝑊𝐿𝐶 = 𝑊𝐿𝐶
∗ − 𝑊𝐿𝐶 = 𝐴𝐸𝐵.  
Assume now a country whose demand is represented by line 𝐷′ because, say, of a larger population 
(or greater preference for 𝑄). Open-access equilibrium is at point 𝐴′ where 𝐴𝐶 and 𝐷′ intersect and 
which is located in the SC segment of the 𝐴𝐶 curve. For simplicity, assume 𝐷′ is such that output is also 
𝑄0 at 𝐴′. The optimum is at 𝐸′ where 𝐷′ and 𝑀𝐶 intersect. 
11 
There are three ways to obtain the welfare cost, ∆𝑊𝑆𝐶, of open access in this case:  
 
1. The difference in the cost of producing 𝑄0 under demand 𝐷 and 𝐷′ is 𝑃𝐴
′𝐴′𝐴𝑃𝐴 = (Distance 
𝐴𝐴′)∗ 𝑄0, while the increase in output from 𝑄0 to 𝑄1
′  generates the gain 𝐴′𝐸′𝐵. Hence, the 
welfare cost of open access is ∆𝑊𝑆𝐶 =  𝑃𝐴
′𝐴′𝐴𝑃𝐴 + 𝐴
′𝐸′𝐵. 
2. Note that there is no producer surplus under open access as 𝑝 = 𝐴𝐶. Hence, welfare is equal 
to the consumer surplus, i.e., the area between the demand curve and the price line. At 𝐴′, 
the consumer surplus is the area below the demand curve and above the 𝑃𝐴
′𝐴′ line. At 𝐸′, 𝐴𝐶 
is given by point 𝐼′, so that welfare is the area between the demand curve and the horizontal 
line at the 𝐼′ level (or the line 𝑃𝐼
′𝐼′, with point 𝑃𝐼
′ on the 𝑦-axis not shown). Thus, the welfare 
cost is equal to the area between the lines 𝑃𝐴
′𝐴′, 𝑃𝐼
′𝐼′ (the horizontal line through point 𝐼′) and 
the demand curve, i.e., ∆𝑊𝑆𝐶 = 𝑃𝐴
′𝐴′𝐸′𝐼′𝑃𝐼
′. 
3. Consumption is 𝑄0 rather than 𝑄1
′ > 𝑄0, with a loss equal to 𝐴′𝑄0𝑄1
′ 𝐸′. Second, the decrease 
in output from 𝑄1
′  to 𝑄0 implies a higher production cost. The cost increase has three 
components: i) the cost of the increase in output from 𝑄1
′  to 𝑄𝑀𝐴𝑋, which is equal to the area 
below the 𝑀𝐶 curve, i.e., 𝐸′𝑄1
′ 𝑄𝑀𝐴𝑋∞; ii) the cost of the decrease in output from 𝑄𝑀𝐴𝑋 to 
𝑄1
′  on the backward-bending part of the 𝐴𝐶 curve, equal to 𝐾𝑄1
′ 𝑄𝑀𝐴𝑋(-∞); and iii) the cost 
of the decrease in output from 𝑄1
′  to 𝑄0, i.e., the area 𝐵
′𝑄0𝑄1
′ 𝐾. Thus, the welfare cost, ∆𝑊𝑆𝐶, 
of open access in this case is ∆𝑊𝑆𝐶 = 𝐴
′𝐵′𝐾𝐸′ + 𝐸′∞(−∞)𝐾.12 
The reasons for the difference between welfare cost under HC, ∆𝑊𝐻𝐶, and under SC, ∆𝑊𝑆𝐶, are: optimal 
output is larger (smaller) than open-access output for SC (HC) – with a welfare gain 𝐴′𝐵′𝐾𝐸′ under 
SC13 – and the decline in cost is greater under SC.  
The analysis suggests that ∆𝑊𝐻𝐶 and especially ∆𝑊𝑆𝐶 is significantly larger than ∆𝑊𝐿𝐶. The 
difference between them is dampened when it comes to the representative individual’s utility 𝑈 =
𝑊/𝕃 rather than to aggregate welfare 𝑊 if demand 𝐷′ is larger than 𝐷 due to a larger population 𝕃 and 
not a difference in taste. Nevertheless, the utility cost under HC and SC is either a multiple or a greater 
order of magnitude than under LC (see Section 3.3).  
As 𝑝 = 𝐴𝐶 under open access, the producer surplus is nil and the NR value is zero. However, though 
its private value is nil, the NR’s social value is positive as it generates a consumer surplus under a 
positive output that is partly consumed domestically.   
                                                     
11 The HC segment is the area between 𝐴𝐶’s turning point where 𝑄 = 𝑄𝑀𝐴𝑋 (or ?̂? in Section 2.1) and the point where 𝑀𝐶 
and 𝐴𝐶 intersect.  
12 Given that the negative segment of the 𝑀𝐶 curve is the mirror image of its positive segment, the welfare cost is also ∆𝑊𝑆𝐶 =
𝐴′𝐵′𝐾𝐸′ + 2 ∗ 𝐸′𝑄1
′ 𝑄𝑀𝐴𝑋∞. 
13 Assume HC prevails, with the demand curve – denoted by 𝐷2 (not shown in Figure 1) – intersecting the backward-bending 
segment of the 𝐴𝐶 curve at an output 𝑄2 (not shown), with 𝑄𝐼 < 𝑄2 < 𝑄𝑀𝐴𝑋, where 𝑄𝐼 = 𝐿𝐼(𝛼 − 𝛽𝐿𝐼) corresponds to the 
output where 𝐴𝐶 and 𝑀𝐶 intersect (𝐿𝐼 =
2𝛼
3𝛽
, 𝑄𝐼 =
2𝛼2
9𝛽
). As is clear from Figure 1, optimal output, 𝑄2
∗, the output where 𝐷2 
and 𝑀𝐶 intersect, is smaller than 𝑄𝐼. Thus, 𝑄2
∗ < 𝑄𝐼 < 𝑄2, and 𝑝2
∗ > 𝑝𝐼 > 𝑝2. Thus, contrary to SC, HC’s optimal output 
(price) is smaller (higher) than open-access output.  
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Figure 1: Autarky under Low and High Congestion 
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3.1.1 Migration 
Assume a developed country allows a given number of individuals to immigrate. This results in a 
decrease in demand, from 𝐷′ to 𝐷𝐿
′  in Figure 1, and raises welfare, with the increase largest if SC prevails 
initially and LC prevails after migration, in which case welfare rises from the area above 𝑃𝐴
′𝑑′ and below 
𝐷𝐿
′ , to the area 𝑃𝐴
′𝑑′𝑎′𝑃𝑎
′. 
3.2 Solution  
This section provides the solution to the model for both an unregulated (open-access) and an optimally 
regulated NR. 
3.2.1. Open Access 
Utility maximization implies that the commodity’s relative price, 𝑝, equals the ratio of marginal utilities, 
i.e., 𝑝 = 
𝑈𝑞
𝑈𝑚
= 
𝑚
𝑞
=
𝑀
𝑄
 =
𝕃−𝐿
𝐿(𝛼−𝛽𝐿)
, where 𝐴𝑃𝐿 = 𝛼 − 𝛽𝐿 > 0 or 𝐿 <
𝛼
𝛽
. Under open access, 𝑝 = 𝐴𝐶 =
1
𝛼−𝛽𝐿
. Thus, 
𝕃−𝐿
𝐿(𝛼−𝛽𝐿)
=
1
𝛼−𝛽𝐿
 or =
𝕃
2
, so that the condition 𝐿 <
𝛼
𝛽
 is equivalent to 𝕃 <
2𝛼
𝛽
. The solution is:  
𝐿 =
𝕃
2
, 𝑀 =
𝕃
2
, 𝑚 =
1
2
, 𝑄 =
𝕃
2
(𝛼 −
𝛽𝕃
2
), 𝑞 =
1
2
(𝛼 −
𝛽𝕃
2
), 𝑈 =
1
2
 (𝛼 −
𝛽𝕃
2
)
1/2
.    (3)  
3.2.2 Optimum 
Under optimal regulation, 𝑝 = 𝑀𝐶, or 
𝑀
𝑄
=
𝕃−𝐿
𝐿(𝛼−𝛽𝐿)
=
1
𝛼−2𝛽𝐿
, which is a quadratic equation, namely 
3𝛽𝐿2 − 2(𝛼 + 𝛽𝕃)𝐿 + 𝛼𝕃 = 0. The solution is: 
 
𝐿∗ =
1
3𝛽
(𝛼 + 𝛽𝕃 − √𝛼2 + 𝛽2𝕃2 − 𝛼𝛽𝕃), 𝑀∗ = 𝕃 − 𝐿∗, 14      (4) 
with the representative individual’s output 𝑞∗ = 𝐿∗(𝛼 − 𝛽𝐿∗)/𝕃 and 𝑚∗ = 1 − 𝐿∗/𝕃.  
Note that equations (3) and (4) imply 𝐿∗ < 𝐿. 15 16  
3.3 Simulation 
Define ∇𝑥 ≡ (𝑥 − 𝑥∗)/𝑥∗, 𝑥 = 𝑈, 𝑁, 𝑄, 𝐿. This section examines the relationship between ∇𝑥 and 
parameter 𝕃, for given values of NR endowment, 𝛼, and externality parameter, 𝛽. Robustness of the 
results is examined in Section 3.4 by using i) different values for the production and utility function 
parameters, and ii) different functional forms.  
The values of 𝛼 and 𝛽 selected in the ‘base case’ are 𝛼 = 10 and 𝛽 = 1 (other cases are examined 
in Section 3.4). Table 1 shows results for the individual 𝕃-values 1, 4 and 9 under LC, 11 under HC, and 
                                                     
14 The sign in front of the square root is negative as √𝛼2 + 𝛽2𝕃2 − 𝛼𝛽𝕃 = √(𝛼 − 𝛽𝕃)2 +  𝛼𝛽𝕃  > 𝛼 − 𝛽𝕃, i.e., a positive 
sign implies 𝐿∗ > 2𝛼/3𝛽, which cannot be as 𝐿∗ must be located in the LC segment of the 𝐴𝐶 curve where 𝑀𝑃𝐿 > 0, i.e., 
𝐿∗ < ?̂? = 𝛼/2𝛽. 
15 Assume the opposite, i.e., 𝐿 =
𝕃
2
≤ 𝐿∗ =
1
3𝛽
[𝛼 + 𝛽𝕃 − √𝛼2 + 𝛽2𝕃2 − 𝛼𝛽𝕃], or 
3𝛽𝕃
2
≤ 𝛼 + 𝛽𝕃 − √𝛼2 + 𝛽2𝕃2 − 𝛼𝛽𝕃, i.e., 
√𝛼2 + 𝛽2𝕃2 − 𝛼𝛽𝕃 ≤ 𝛼 −
𝛽𝕃
2
= 𝐴𝑃𝐿. With 𝐴𝑃𝐿 > 0, we have 𝛼
2 + 𝛽2𝕃2 − 𝛼𝛽𝕃 ≤ 𝛼2 +
𝛽2𝕃2
4
− 𝛼𝛽𝕃, or 𝛽2𝕃2 ≤ 
𝛽2𝕃2
4
, 
which is false. Thus, 𝐿∗ < 𝐿.  
16 From (1), (2), and (4), 𝑈∗ =  
1
3𝛽𝕃
[𝛼𝛽𝕃(𝛼 + 𝛽𝕃) −  
2
3
(𝛼3 + 𝛽3𝕃3)  + 
2
3
(𝛼2 + 𝛽2𝕃2 − 𝛼𝛽𝕃)3/2]
1/2
.  
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16, 19, 20 and 50 under SC. Table 2 does the same for central values of 𝕃 in each of the three congestion 
categories.  
A. Results for individual 𝕃 values  
i) Welfare  
Table 1 shows ∇𝑈1 = −.033 (for 𝕃 = 1), ∇𝑈4 = −.707, ∇𝑈9 = −6,07, ∇𝑈11 = −13.5, ∇𝑈16 =
−33.3, and ∇𝑈19 = −64.3 percent, with LC (HC) (SC) for the first three (fourth) (last two) 𝕃 values. 
Thus, ∇𝑈19 = 1983∇𝑈1, 91∇𝑈4 and 10.6∇𝑈9 (LC cases) and ∇𝑈19 = 4.8∇𝑈11 (the HC case). Thus, the 
welfare cost of open access for 𝕃 = 19 is from one to three degrees of magnitude greater than under LC 
and is a multiple of that under HC.  
 
- For 𝕃 = 16 (which is below 𝕃’s central value of 16.67 under SC), ∇𝑈16 = 1028∇𝑈1, 47.12∇𝑈4 
and 5.62∇𝑈9, and 2.47∇𝑈11. Thus, ∇𝑈16 is between three degrees of magnitude greater and a 
multiple of welfare costs under LC and is a multiple of ∇𝑈11 under HC. 
- For 𝕃 = 11 (which is below 𝕃’s central value of 11.67 under HC), ∇𝑈11 = 148∇𝑈1, 19.1∇𝑈4 and 
2.28∇𝑈9. In other words, ∇𝑈11 is between two degrees of magnitude greater and a multiple of 
welfare costs under LC.  
 
ii) Natural Resource  
- For 𝕃 = 19 (an SC case), ∇𝑁19 is −91 percent or 827∇𝑁1, 31.4∇𝑁4, and 3.7∇𝑁9 for the LC cases, 
and 2.93∇𝑁11 for the HC case. For 𝕃 = 16 (an SC case), ∇𝑁16 = −67 percent or 608∇𝑁1, 23.1∇𝑁4 
and 2.68∇𝑁9 for the LC cases, and 2.16∇𝑁11 for the HC case.  
- Thus, ∇𝑁19 and ∇𝑁16 are both between two orders of magnitude greater and a multiple of ∇𝑁 under 
LC and a multiple of ∇𝑁 under HC.  
- The same result obtains for HC relative to LC, with ∇𝑁11 = −31 percent or 282∇𝑁1, 10.7∇𝑁4 and 
1.35∇𝑁9.  
 
Table 1. Autarky: Open Access vs. Optimum  
 
 
𝕃 
Open Access (𝑥) 
  𝐿        𝑁        𝑄          𝑈 
Optimum (𝑥∗) 
  𝐿∗      𝑁∗      𝑄∗         𝑈∗      
Difference ∇𝑥 =
𝑥−𝑥∗
𝑥∗
 (%) 
∇𝐿      ∇𝑁      ∇𝑄       ∇𝑈 
 1  .50      9.5      4.75     1.541 .49    9.51    4.63     1.542 2.7    -.11     1.06     -.033 
    4  2.0      8.0      16.0     1.414 1.8     8.2     14.5     1.424    15      -2.9    10.3     -.707 
    9  4.5      5.5      24.8     1.173 3.2     6.8     21.6     1.248     43      -25     14.6      -6.07 
 11  5.5      4.5      24.8      1.061 3.5     6.5     22.8     1.226     58      -31      9.0      -13.5   
16  8.0      2.0      16.0      .7071 4.0     6.0     24.0     1.061   100    -67      -33      -33.3 
19  9.5      .50      4.75      .3536 4.2     5.8     24.4      .991     127    -91      -81      -64.3   
iii) Employment  
∇𝐿19 = 127 percent, or 47∇𝐿1, 8.5∇𝐿4 and 3.0∇𝐿9 (LC cases), and 2.2 ∇𝐿11 (HC case).  
- Thus, for the SC case, the excess employment (variable input use) is between one order of magnitude 
larger and a multiple of that under LC, and a multiple of that under HC.  
iv) Output 
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∇𝑄 < (>) 0 under LC and HC (SC), i.e., optimal output is smaller (larger) for LC and HC (SC) than 
open-access output. As a small tax, 𝜏, raises cost and reduces 𝐿, the output effect 𝜕𝑄/𝜕𝜏 < (>)0 under 
LC (HC and SC), i.e., ∇𝑄 and 𝜕𝑄/𝜕𝜏 have opposite signs for HC.   
Table 2.  Open Access vs. Optimum under Autarky: Central 𝕃 Values a 
 
 
𝕃 
Open Access (𝑥) 
   
 𝑁          𝑈 
Optimum  
(𝑥∗) 
  
 𝑁∗       𝑈∗      
Difference (%) 
∇𝑥 =
𝑥−𝑥∗
𝑥∗
  
  ∇𝑁       ∇𝑈    
Ratio  
(∇𝑥/∇𝑥𝐿𝐶) 
 
∇𝑁/∇𝑁𝐿𝐶   ∇𝑈/∇𝑈𝐿𝐶 
   LC:  5.0   7.5     1.369  7.9     1.387  -4.9     -1.29        1                 1 
HC: 11.67   4.2     1.021  6.4     1.169   -35     -12.7      7.1              9.8     
SC: 16.67   1.7     .6455  5.9     1.046   -72     -38.3      14.7            29.7 
a:  Results are for the central values of 𝕃 in each one of the three congestion categories. 
B. Results for central 𝕃 values 
Table 2 presents the welfare and NR results associated with the central value of 𝕃 in each the three 
congestion categories, namely 𝕃 = 5.0 (11.67) (16.67) for LC (HC) (SC).  
The welfare cost ∇𝑈𝑆𝐶 = −38.3 percent, or 29.7∇𝑈𝐿𝐶 and 3.0∇𝑈𝐻𝐶, and ∇𝑈𝐻𝐶 = 9.8∇𝑈𝐿𝐶. The NR 
cost ∇𝑁𝑆𝐶 = −72 percent, or 14.7∇𝑁𝐿𝐶 and 2.1∇𝑁𝐻𝐶, and ∇𝑁𝐻𝐶 = 7.1∇𝑁𝐿𝐶.    
Thus, even though analyses have focused on the low-congestion (LC) category, Table 2 shows that 
the central result for open access’ welfare impact under SC (HC) is of a greater order of magnitude (a 
multiple) of that under LC, with a welfare cost of about 30 (10) times that of the latter. Moreover, the 
NR impact under SC (HC) is also of a greater order of magnitude (a multiple) of that under LC, with a 
NR loss of about 15 (7) times that under LC. These results suggest that studies have for the most part 
focused on the least important congestion category.  
3.3.1 Production tax  
Appendix 1 provides the optimal tax solution and a table of optimal tax rates. Denote the tax rate by 𝜏, 
with 𝑝 = (1 +  𝜏)𝑝𝜏, where 𝑝𝜏 is the producer price. The optimal tax rate, 𝜏
∗, as a function of 𝕃, is 
provided for two sets of parameter values, namely 𝛼 (𝛽) = 10 (1) and 𝛼 (𝛽) = 10 (2). As the optimal 
solution can be written as a function of 𝛼/𝛽 (see Appendix), it follows that 𝜏∗ is the same for, say, 𝛼 (𝛽) 
= 10 (2), 5 (1) and 17 (3.4).   
In the case of 𝛼 = 10 and 𝛽 = 1, 𝜏∗ is (in percent) 255 for 𝕃 = 19, 200 for 𝕃 = 16, 85.4 for 𝕃 = 9, 
27.2 for 𝕃 = 4, and 5.4 for 𝕃 = 1. Thus, the optimal tax rate under SC, i.e., for 𝕃 = 19 (16), is 47.2 
(37.0) times the rate for 𝕃 = 1 and is 15.8 times the 𝕃 = 1 rate in the case of 𝕃 = 9 under HC.    
The optimal tax increases with the externality parameter, 𝛽, and decreases with the endowment 
parameter, 𝛼. For instance, the level of 𝜏∗ for 𝛽 = 2 is double to triple the corresponding level for 𝛽 =
1. In the case of 𝛼 = 10, 𝜏∗ = 621 for 𝕃 = 19 (2.4 times the 𝛽 = 1 rate), 504 for 𝕃 = 16 (2.5 times the 
𝛽 = 1 rate), 236 for 𝕃 = 9 (2.8 times the 𝛽 = 1 rate), and 11.7 for 𝕃 = 1 (2.2 times the 𝛽 = 1 rate).  
The increase in the optimal tax rate as 𝕃 increases helps dampen the increased pressure on the NR. 
This can be seen from Table 1 where the decline in NR and welfare as 𝕃 increases from 1 to 19 under 
the optimal tax is half that under open access.  
The robustness of the results presented in this section is examined in Section 3.4. 
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3.4 Robustness 
This section examines the robustness of the relationship between congestion levels and ∇𝑥 by using a) 
different values for the utility and production function parameters, and b) different functional forms. 
Solutions and results are provided in Appendix 2.  
3.4.1 Alternative parameter values  
The values of ∇𝑈 and ∇𝑁 do not depend on the value of the individual production function parameters 
𝛼 and 𝛽 but rather depend on the value of their ratio, 𝛼/𝛽. In other words, results for (𝛼, 𝛽) also hold 
for (𝜆𝛼, 𝜆𝛽), 𝜆 > 0.17 The analysis so far assumed 𝛼/𝛽 = 10. The values of 𝛼/𝛽 used here are: i) 2, ii) 
6, iii) 20, and iv) 100. Panel A (B) of Table 2A, Appendix 2, shows results for case 𝑖) ( 𝑖𝑖)).  
Recall that output 𝑄 > 0 requires that 𝐴𝑃𝐿 = 𝛼 − 𝛽𝕃/2 > 0 or < 2𝛼/𝛽.  
𝑖) 𝛼/𝛽 = 2  
For 𝕃 = 3 (under SC), ∇𝑈3 (∇𝑁3) = −27 (−59) percent or 17∇𝑈1 (12∇𝑁1). 
𝑖𝑖) 𝛼/𝛽 = 6 
For 𝕃 = 11 (under SC), ∇𝑈11 (∇𝑁11) = −55 (−86) percent, or 162∇𝑈1 (210∇𝑁1) and 107∇𝑈2 
(45∇𝑁2) for LC cases, and 8.3∇𝑈6 (3.4∇𝑁6) under HC.  
iii) 𝛼/𝛽 = 20 
∇𝑈19 (∇𝑁19) = −7.056 (−22.3) percent, or 552∇𝑈1 (679∇𝑁1) and 21.0∇𝑈4 (24.8∇𝑁4). 
iv) 𝛼/𝛽 = 100 
  ∇𝑈19 (∇𝑁19) = −.137 (−.544) percent, or 427∇𝑈1 (431∇𝑁1) and 16.2∇𝑈4 (16.5∇𝑁4).   
As for preferences, a general form of the utility function in equation (2) is:  
 
𝑈 = 𝑞𝛾𝑚1−𝛾, 𝛾 𝜖 (0, 1).          (5) 
Equation (2) assumed 𝛾 = .5. As the share of farmed fish in an individual’s budget is likely to be 
significantly below . 5, ratios ∇𝑈19/∇𝑈1 and ∇𝑁19/∇𝑁1 are examined for 𝛾 = .1 and 𝛾 = .2.  For 𝛾 =
.1, we have ∇𝑈19/∇𝑈1 = 183 and ∇𝑁19/∇𝑁1 = 204. And for 𝛾 = .2, we have ∇𝑈19/∇𝑈1 = 60.1 and 
∇𝑁19/∇𝑁1 = 105.  
Thus, the findings that the welfare cost under HC and SC is a multiple or of a greater order of magnitude 
than under LC also holds for alternative values of the parameters of the production and utility functions. 
3.4.2 Alternative functional forms 
Two alternative utility functions and two alternative production functions are examined below. The 
solutions and simulation results are provided in Appendix 3. 
                                                     
17 As 𝐿∗ =
1
3𝛽
[𝛼 + 𝛽𝕃 − √𝛼2 + 𝛽2𝕃2 − 𝛼𝛽𝕃] =
1
3
[
𝛼
𝛽
+ 𝕃 − √(
𝛼
𝛽
)
2
+ 𝕃2 − (
𝛼
𝛽
) 𝕃], it is clear that 𝐿∗ only depends on the 
ratio 𝛼/𝛽 (and 𝕃). Hence, the same holds for 𝑀∗ = 𝕃 − 𝐿∗ and 𝑚∗ = 𝑀∗/𝕃, while 𝑄𝜆
∗ = 𝐿∗(𝜆𝛼 −  𝜆𝛽𝐿∗) =
𝜆𝐿∗(𝛼 −  𝛽𝐿∗) = 𝜆𝑄∗ and 𝑞𝜆
∗ =  𝜆𝑞∗. Thus, 𝑈𝜆
∗ = 𝜆.5𝑈∗. And as 𝐿 = 𝕃/2 is independent of 𝛼 and 𝛽, so is 𝑀 and 𝑚, while 
𝑄𝜆 = 𝜆𝑄 and 𝑈𝜆 = 𝜆
.5𝑈. Thus, ∇𝑈𝜆 = (𝑈𝜆 − 𝑈𝜆
∗)/𝑈𝜆
∗ = ∇𝑈. The same holds for ∇𝑁 as 𝑁𝜆
∗ = 𝜆𝑁∗ and 𝑁𝜆 = 𝜆𝑁, so that 
∇𝑁𝜆 = ∇𝑁. 
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A. Utility functions  
I. The first (constant-relative-risk-aversion) utility function is (𝑥) =
𝑥1−𝜇
1−𝜇
, 𝜇 ≠ 1. Assuming separability 
and 𝜇 = 1/2, we have:  
 
𝑈(𝑚, 𝑞) = 𝑈(𝑚) + 𝑈(𝑞) =
𝑚1/2
1/2
+
𝑞1/2
1/2
.        (6) 
The solution is derived from a quadratic equation for (open-access) 𝐿 and from a cubic equation for 
(optimal) 𝐿∗. Simulation results for 𝛽 = 1 are presented in Table A2 in Appendix 3 and are discussed 
below.  
In Panel A, 𝛼 = 6, LC prevails for 𝕃 < 6. In percent, ∇𝑈1(∇𝑁1) = −.19 (−.93), ∇𝑈3 (∇𝑁3) =
−3.4 (−14.9) or 18∇𝑈1 (16.1∇𝑁1), ∇𝑈5 (∇𝑁5) = −9.0 (−36.4) or 47.3∇𝑈1 (38.2∇𝑁1). Thus, ∇𝑈 and 
∇𝐿 at middle and higher congestion levels within the LC category are an order of magnitude greater than 
at lower ones. SC prevails for 8 < 𝕃 < 12. For 𝕃 = 10, we have, in percent, ∇𝑈10(∇𝑁10) =
−21.5 (−71.7) = 113∇𝑈1(77.2∇𝑁1). Comparing 𝕃’s central values for SC and LC, we have 
∇𝑈10(∇𝑁10) = 20.6∇𝑈3 (14.6∇𝑁3). Similar results obtain for 𝛼 = 4 (as shown in panel B). 
Thus, as with the original utility function in (2), the welfare and NR losses under SC are a multiple of 
those under LC or are of a greater order of magnitude.   
II. The second utility function is:  
𝑈 = (𝑚 −
𝑚2
2
) + (𝑞 −
𝑞2
2
) , 𝑚 =
𝑀
𝕃
, 𝑞 =
𝑄
𝕃
.      (7)  
The solution is derived from a cubic equation for both 𝐿 and 𝐿∗. Solution and simulation results are in 
Appendix 3. For 𝛼 = 2 and 𝛽 = 1, ∇𝑈1 (∇𝑁1) = −.375 (−2.90) percent, ∇𝑈5 (∇𝑁5) = −7.77(−77.5) 
percent or 20.7∇𝑈1 (26.7∇𝑁1), and ∇𝑈10 (∇𝑁10) = −12.1 (−81) percent or  32.1∇𝑈1 (28∇𝑁1).  
 
As with the original utility function in (2) and the one in (6), the welfare losses under SC are a 
multiple of the losses under LC or are of a greater order of magnitude.   
B. Production functions  
 
I. The first production function is:  
 
𝑄 = 𝐿[𝛼 − 𝛽(log𝐿)], 𝐿 > 1.        (8) 
 
Under open access, 𝐿 = 𝕃/2, with 𝑈 =
1
2
 [𝛼 − 𝛽 (log
𝕃
2
)]
1/2
. The optimal value of 𝐿 is 𝐿∗ =
𝕃
2
[1 −
𝛽
2𝛼−𝛽(1+2log𝐿∗)
].18       
 
As 𝐿 =
𝕃
2
> 1, we have 𝕃 > 2. And 𝐴𝑃𝐿 = 𝛼 − 𝛽(log𝐿) > 0 implies 𝐿 < 𝑒
𝛼/𝛽 . Assume 𝛼 = 10 and 
𝛽 = 2. Then, 𝐿 < 𝑒5 = 148.5 or 𝕃 < 297. Thus, 2 < 𝕃 < 297. 
For 𝕃 = 3, 𝑈 = 1.5488, 𝑈∗ = 1.5510, and ∇𝑈3 = −.08 percent. For 𝕃 = 296, ∇𝑈296 = −93.3 
percent. Thus, in percent and absolute value, . 08 < |∇𝑈| < 93.3, with a maximum ratio of 
∇𝑈296/∇𝑈3 = 1166.3.   
                                                     
18 As there is no closed solution for 𝐿∗ [𝐿∗ is a function of log(𝐿∗)], the solution was obtained by ‘guessing’ a value of 𝐿∗ 
(denoted by x), using the related log(𝐿∗) value in 𝐿∗ =
𝕃
2
[1 −
𝛽
2𝛼−𝛽(1+2log𝐿∗)
] and checking if the solution for 𝐿∗ (denoted 
by y) was consistent with the initial guess, i.e., whether y = x. If not, the next value of 𝐿∗ used was between x and y, 
repeating the exercise until 𝑦 and x converged.  
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The welfare cost for the central value of 𝕃 under LC, HC and SC is (in percent) ∇𝑈𝐿𝐶 = −4.30, 
∇𝑈𝐻𝐶 = −17.72, and ∇𝑈𝑆𝐶 = −47.80, i.e., ∇𝑈𝑆𝐶 = 11.1∇𝑈𝐿𝐶 and ∇𝑈𝐻𝐶 = 4.1∇𝑈𝐿𝐶. Thus, the welfare 
cost for 𝕃’s central value under SC (HC) is of a greater order of magnitude (a multiple) of that under 
LC.  
II. Substituting production function 𝑄𝜆 = 𝜆𝐿(𝛼 − 𝛽𝐿) = 𝜆𝑄, 𝜆 > 0 for 𝑄 has no impact on 𝐿, 𝐿
∗, 𝑚, 𝑚∗ 
or ∇𝑥 (𝑥 = 𝐿, 𝑄, 𝑁, 𝑈), i.e., ∇𝑥(𝜆𝛼, 𝜆𝛽) = ∇𝑥(𝛼, 𝛽), 19 and hence is excluded in what follows. In fact, 
replacing the production function 𝑄 with a monotonically increasing function of 𝑄 has no impact on any 
of the ∇𝑥 solutions under autarky, though the same need not hold in the case of international trade.  
In conclusion, the results obtained in Section 3.3 that the welfare cost of open access under HC and 
especially under SC are a multiple or of a greater order of magnitude than those under LC are supported 
by the results obtained in this section.  
4. Trade 
This section looks at three scenarios. In order to isolate the issue of externalities associated with different 
property rights regimes, the first scenario (in Section 4.1) follows Chichilnisky (1994) by assuming a 
world with two countries, C1 and C2, that are identical except for their property rights (or regulatory 
regimes, with an open-access common-property regime in C1 and a private property (or regulated) 
regime in C2. Next, Open access prevails in both C1 and C2 in the second scenario (Section 4.2), with 
C2’s population larger than C1’s (𝕃2 > 𝕃1). In the third scenario in , C2 does not produce the commodity 
in the third scenario (Section 4.3).  
4.1 Different property rights regime 
Chichilnisky (1994) states (p. 855) that “With common property regimes, more is supplied at any given 
price than is supplied with private property regimes.” This is shown in Figure 1 of that paper (p. 857) 
which depicts the standard low-congestion (LC) case. Similarly, Proposition 1 (p. 857) states: “The 
common-property supply curve for the resource lies below the private-property supply curve, so that 
under common-property regimes, more is supplied at a given price. 20 Both supply curves are increasing 
functions of resource prices.”  
The paper’s new result relates to the impact of trade, where the author states (p. 852) that “… for the 
country with poorly defined property rights, trade with a country with well-defined property rights 
increases the overuse of resources and makes the misallocation worse …” As the author shows, trade 
reduces welfare for the exporting country and worsens its environment as well as the global one.  
Similarly, Brander and Taylor (1997) examine a small open economy’s trade under LC and open 
access to a NR. They state that trade reduces steady-state utility for a diversified resource exporter and 
terms-of-trade improvements may be welfare reducing.21  
                                                     
19 With = 𝑚1/2𝑞1/2, 𝑝 =
𝑈𝑞
𝑈𝑚
= 𝐴𝐶, or 
𝑚
𝑞
=
𝕃−𝐿
 𝜆𝐿(𝛼−𝛽𝐿)
=
1
 𝜆(𝛼−𝛽𝐿)
, i.e., 𝜆 cancels out. Thus, as in (3), 𝐿 =
𝕃
2
. At the optimum, 
𝕃−𝐿
 𝜆𝐿(𝛼−𝛽𝐿)
=
1
 𝜆(𝛼−2𝛽𝐿)
 and 𝐴 also cancels out, i.e., it has no impact on 𝐿∗ (see 4). Thus,  𝜆 has no impact on 𝑚 or 𝑚∗ either, 
while 𝑞 and 𝑞∗ are multiplied by  𝜆 , and 𝑈 and 𝑈∗ are multiplied by √ 𝜆. Hence, ∇𝑥 ≡ (𝑥 − 𝑥∗)/𝑥∗ is unaffected by 
changes in 𝜆.  
20 The common (private) property supply curve is referred to here as the 𝐴𝐶 (𝑀𝐶) curve. 
21 The model provided here differs from Brander and Taylor’s (1997) in three important ways. First, I examine steady-state 
solutions while they also examine transition paths and the discounted sum of instantaneous utility (or ‘welfare’). Second, 
they assume a small open economy facing exogenously given terms of trade, while these are determined endogenously in 
this paper. Third, I also examine the results under HC and SC. An interesting analysis of North-South trade’s impact on the 
environment (pollution) – rather than on NR – where environmental protection depends on income is Copeland and Taylor 
(1994). 
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I obtain the same results as Chichilnisky (1994) and Brander and Taylor (1997) under both LC and 
HC. However, the opposite holds under SC, in which case trade generates a welfare gain for both 
countries and an improvement in the international allocation of environmental resources.  
Section 4.1.1 provides a graphical analysis, Section 4.1.2 solves the model, Section 4.1.3 presents 
the simulations. 
4.1.1 Graphical analysis  
Under LC, the demand curve is 𝐷 and equilibrium under autarky is at point 𝐴 for C1 and at point 𝐸 for 
C2 in Figure 2. With trade, the price is 𝑃𝑇, with 𝐺𝐹 = 𝐻𝐺, i.e., C1’s exports equal C2’s imports. C2 
obtains a welfare gain ∆𝑊2 = 𝐸𝐻𝐺. Since price equals average cost under open access, the producer 
surplus is always equal to zero and welfare is equal to the consumer surplus. Under autarky, price is 𝑃𝐴 
and welfare is 𝑍𝐴𝑃𝐴. Under trade, price is 𝑃𝑇 and welfare is 𝑍𝐺𝑃𝑇. Thus, the impact of trade on welfare 
is ∆𝑊1 = −𝑃𝑇𝐺𝐴𝑃𝐴. Employment, 𝐿, is higher (and thus NR is lower) under trade (point F) than under 
autarky (point 𝐴) in C1. The opposite holds for C2 where trade reduces output. Despite the fact that 
𝑀𝐶1 > 𝑀𝐶2 (and 𝑁𝑅1 < 𝑁𝑅2), output increases in C1 and declines in C2, thereby exacerbating the 
global distortion in the allocation of 𝑁𝑅. 
The finding that trade leads to a commodity exporter’s welfare loss and worsens the distortion in the 
global NR allocation confirms Chichilnisky’s (1994) and Brander and Taylor’s (1997) findings. The 
same result holds in the HC case as C2’s (optimal) price is also higher than C1’s (open-access) price 
under autarky. However, in contrast to the LC situation, C1’s output declines as employment rises in 
this case, further raising C1’s welfare cost and the international misallocation of NR (as output falls in 
both countries).  
In the SC case, with demand given by 𝐷′, equilibrium is at 𝐴′ for C1 and at 𝐸′ for C2. The autarkic 
price is higher in open-access C1 than in regulated C2. Hence, C2 exports the commodity to C1, i.e., the 
direction of trade is reversed, which raises C1’s NR. Output expands (contracts) in the country with 
lower (higher) 𝑀𝐶 (since 𝑀𝐶 < 0 in C1) and lower (higher) 𝐴𝐶 – represented by point 𝐼′ (𝐴′) – and 
whose NR quality is higher (lower). This improves both the open-access country’s and the global NR 
quality or global environment.  
Consumption is at point 𝑆 where the (horizontal) distance between 𝑆 and the 𝑀𝐶 curve is equal to 
the distance between the 𝐴𝐶 curve and 𝑆. The new equilibrium price corresponding to point 𝑆 is 𝑃𝑆 (not 
shown). Denoting the intersection of the horizontal line from 𝑆 to the 𝑀𝐶 curve by 𝑋, the welfare gain 
from trade for C2 is ∆𝑊2 = 𝑆𝑋𝐸
′ > 0 and the welfare gain for C1 is ∆𝑊1 = 𝑃𝐴
′𝐴′𝑆𝑃𝑆 > 0. Thus, trade 
improves the global environment and raises global welfare (∆𝑊 = ∆𝑊1 + ∆𝑊2 > 0) in this case.  
4.1.2 Solution 
Under trade, price equals average cost in C1 and marginal cost in C2, i.e., 𝑝𝑇 =
1
𝛼−𝛽𝐿1𝑇
 =
1
𝛼−2𝛽𝐿2𝑇
∗ , 
implying that 𝐿1𝑇 = 2𝐿2𝑇
∗ . The solution for 𝐿1𝑇 and 𝐿2𝑇
∗  is:  
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Figure 2. Trade under Low and High Congestion 
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𝐿1𝑇 =
2
5𝛽
(1.5𝛼 + 𝛽𝕃 − √2.25𝛼2 + 𝛽2𝕃2 − 2𝛼𝛽𝕃), 22  𝐿2𝑇
∗ = 𝐿1𝑇
2
.      (7) 
Export of 𝑄 from C1 is 𝑄1𝑋  = . 375𝛽𝐿1𝑇(𝐿𝐼 − 𝐿1𝑇) ≷ 0 ⇔ 𝐿1𝑇 ≶ 𝐿𝐼,
23 where 𝐿𝐼 is the point where 𝐴𝐶 
intersects 𝑀𝐶, i.e., the point that separates SC from HC (and where 𝐴𝐶 exhibits an inflection point).  
These results confirm the graphical analysis in the previous section that C1 exports 𝑄 under both LC 
and HC (𝐿1𝑇 < 𝐿𝐼) and imports 𝑀, and it imports 𝑄 under SC (𝐿1𝑇 > 𝐿𝐼) and exports 𝑀. In other words, 
the direction of trade between C1 and C2 is reversed as 𝐿1𝑇 = 𝐿𝐼. The reason is that the inefficiency 
associated with the negative congestion externality is so large under SC that open-access production 
costs are larger in C1 than in C2.  
4.1.3 Simulation 
Table 3 shows the impact of opening up to trade on NR and welfare, where ∆′𝑈(∆′𝑁) represents the 
difference between the value of 𝑈 (𝑁) under trade and under autarky. Panel A (B) shows results for 𝛼 =
10 (2) and 𝛽 = 1. Under autarky, 𝐿1 ≶ 𝐿𝐼 =
2𝛼
3
⟺ 𝑄1𝑆 ≷ 𝑄2𝑆
∗ ⟺ 𝑝1 ≶ 𝑝2
∗ (see Section 3). Thus, as 
long as 𝐿1 < 2𝛼/3, 𝑄1𝑆 > 𝑄2𝑆
∗  and 𝑝1 < 𝑝𝑇 < 𝑝2
∗. Once trade occurs, C1 raises its output and exports 
𝑄, with an increase in the open-access distortion, and a decline in welfare (as terms-of-trade 
improvements reduce welfare for an open-access exporting country) and in NR. In Panel A, trade reduces 
C1’s welfare if 𝐿1 < 𝐿𝐼 = 
2𝛼
3
= 6.67 or 𝕃 = 2𝐿1 < 𝕃I = 13.33. It shows that ∆
′𝑈1 (∆
′𝑁1) ranges from 
−1.47 (−1.68) to −8.39 (−9.6) percent between 𝕃 = 1 and 𝕃 = 11. 
The opposite occurs for 𝕃 > 𝕃I = 13.33 where 𝑄1𝑆 < 𝑄2𝑆 and 𝑝2 < 𝑝𝑇 < 𝑝1 (compare points 
𝐸′, 𝑆 and 𝐴′ in Figure 2), with trade reducing 𝑄’s relative price in C1. This leads C1 to reduce its output 
and to import 𝑄, resulting in an increase in its welfare. This is shown in Panel A for = 16 (19), with 
welfare 20.5 (140) percent higher than under autarky. The negative figures are relatively small because 
they occur at low 𝕃-values, i.e., under LC where the distortion is small. The positive figures occur at 
high 𝕃-values where distortions are large under autarky, and C1’s trade-induced decrease in price 
reduces employment in 𝑄, raising output and consumption, both of which raise welfare.  
  
                                                     
22 From 𝐿2𝑇 =
𝐿1𝑇
2
, we have 𝑄𝑆 = 𝑄1𝑆  +  𝑄2𝑆 = 𝐿1𝑇(𝛼 − 𝛽𝐿1𝑇)  +  
𝐿1𝑇
2
(𝛼 −
𝛽𝐿1𝑇
2
) = 𝐿1𝑇(1.5𝛼 − 1.25𝛽𝐿1𝑇). Also, 𝑀1𝐷 +
𝑝𝑇𝑄1𝐷 =  𝑀2𝐷 + 𝑝𝑇𝑄2𝐷 = 𝕃. Given the same relative price 𝑝𝑇 and preferences, we have 𝑀1𝐷 = 𝑀2𝐷 and 𝑄1𝐷 = 𝑄2𝐷. 
Thus, 𝑄1𝐷 =
𝑄𝑆
2
= (. 75𝛼 − .625𝛽𝐿1𝑇)𝐿1𝑇. Also, 
𝑚1𝐷
𝑞1𝐷
=
𝑀1𝐷
𝑄1𝐷
= 𝑝𝑇 or 𝑀1𝐷 = 𝑝𝑇𝑄1𝐷. As 𝑀1𝐷 + 𝑝𝑇𝑄1𝐷 =  𝕃, we have 
𝑝𝑇𝑄1𝐷 = 𝑀1𝐷 =
𝕃
2
. Thus, 𝑄1𝐷 = 𝐿1𝑇(. 75𝛼 − .625𝛽𝐿1𝑇) =
𝑀1𝐷
𝑝𝑇
=
𝕃
2
(𝛼 − 𝛽𝐿1𝑇), i.e., 1.25𝛽𝐿1𝑇
2 − (1.5𝛼 + 𝛽𝕃)𝐿1𝑇 +
𝛼𝕃 = 0, which implies (7).  
23 Exports of 𝑄 from country C1 is 𝑄1𝑋 = 𝑄1𝑆 − 𝑄1𝐷 = 𝐿1𝑇(𝛼 − 𝛽𝐿1𝑇) − (. 75𝛼 − .625𝛽𝐿1𝑇)𝐿1𝑇 = .25𝛼𝐿1𝑇 −
.375𝛽𝐿1𝑇
2 =. 375𝛽𝐿1𝑇 (
2𝛼
3𝛽
− 𝐿1𝑇) =. 375𝛽𝐿1𝑇(𝐿𝐼 − 𝐿1𝑇), where 𝐿𝐼 =
2𝛼
3𝛽
.  
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Table 3. Trade vs. Autarky (∆′) for Open Access (C1) and at Optimum (C2) 
Panel A: 𝛼 = 10, 𝛽 = 1 
 
𝕃 
Country C1 (Open Access) 
 𝑁1𝑇     𝑈1𝑇        ∆′𝑁1    ∆′𝑈1  
                            (in %) 
Country C2 (Optimum) 
 𝑁2𝑇     𝑈2𝑇      ∆′𝑁2
∗   ∆′𝑈2
∗  
                          (in %) 
C1 + C2 
𝑁𝑇       𝑈𝑇       ∆′𝑁     ∆′𝑈  
                         (in %) 
 1  9.34   1.52     -1.68    -1.47 9.67   1.54     1.65     .41  19.0   3.06    -.01     -.52 
   6  6.35   1.26      -9.3    -4.75 8.18   1.36     7.97     .74 14.5   2.62     .42     -1.9 
 11  4.09   .972      -9.1    -8.39  7.05   1.24     8.44     1.0 11.1   2.21     2.0     -3.1   
16  2.68   .852      33.8     20.5 6.34   1.11     5.66     4.9 9.02   1.96    14.0    11.7 
19  2.14   .849      328      140                                  6.07   1.05     4.66     5.1  8.21   1.90    88.9    65.4   
 
 
Panel B: 𝛼 = 2, 𝛽 = 1 
 
 
𝕃 
Country C1 (Open Access) 
𝑁1𝑇     𝑈1𝑇    ∆′𝑁1    ∆′𝑈1  
                          (in %) 
Country C2 (Optimum) 
 𝑁2𝑇    𝑈2𝑇  ∆′𝑁2
∗    ∆′𝑈2
∗  
                          (in %) 
C1 + C2 
𝑁𝑇       𝑈𝑇        ∆′𝑁    ∆′𝑈  
                        (in %) 
   1 1.38   .587    -8.01    -4.15 1.69   .627    5.62    1.06  3.07   1.21    -.51    -1.46 
   3 .580   .381     16.0      7.75 1.29   .488     7.5     .615 1.87    .87     10.1     3.74 
C2 always gains from trade, though the welfare gains are small relative to either the losses or gains of 
C1, so that the impact on global welfare (a weighted average of the impacts in C1 and C2) has the same 
sign as the impact on C1’s welfare (despite C2’s larger weight since welfare is larger at the optimum 
than under open access). 
Panel B shows that trade reduces (raises) C1’s welfare for 𝕃 = 1 (𝕃 = 3) where LC (SC) prevails as 
𝕃 = 1 < ?̂? = 2  (𝕃 = 3 > 𝕃I = 2.67). Thus, the result is the same as in Panel A, i.e., trade’s welfare 
impact for C1 is negative under LC and positive under SC. Also, whether positive or negative, the impact 
on C1 is greater than that on C2, so that the sign of the impact on global welfare is the same as that on 
C1’s welfare in this case as well.  
Lack of effective vaccine against the SRS bacteria in Chile’s coastal waters has led Chile to use 
antibiotics and pesticides at levels that are multiples of those used by Norway, Scotland and British 
Columbia (Bridsen 2014). Its NR endowment quality – i.e., parameter 𝛼’s level – is thus lower that in 
these countries. Thus, other things equal, open access’ negative impact due to excessive use of variable 
inputs and loss of output, NR and welfare, would be expected to be worse in Chile than in these other 
countries, as would the impact of trade, a presumption that is supported by the simulation results. For 
instance, Section 3.4.1 shows that the cost of open access under autarky is (in percent) ∇𝑈19 (∇𝑁19) =
−.137 (−.544) for 𝛼 = 100 and −7.056 (−22.3) for 𝛼 = 20. Similarly, trade’s impact on C1’s 
welfare cost of open access shown in Panels A and B of Table 3 (in percent) in the case of 𝕃 = 1 is 
−1.47 for 𝛼 = 10 and −4.15 for 𝛼 = 2.  
Thus, other things equal, optimal regulation and management of the aquaculture industry would be 
expected to provided larger gains in the case of Chile. In fact, a debate is ongoing about this issue at this 
point, with meetings between the government and the private sector  
Maurice Schiff 
18 Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Working Papers 
4.2 Exporting under SC  
The analysis shows that, under SC, an open-access country imports the commodity when trading with a 
regulated but otherwise identical country. The SC case might thus appear to have little relevance for 
commodity exporting countries. However, countries differ in a number of ways, with C1 exporting 𝑄 to 
C2 under SC conditions. Assume open access prevails in C1 and that SC prevails under autarky. Then, 
C1 exports commodity 𝑄 in the cases presented below. These are: 
i. C2 is more productive than C1 in the production of good 𝑀, with 𝑀𝑃𝑙 = 𝑤2 > 𝑤1 = 1, 
thereby raising C2’s cost of producing 𝑄 (which is common for commodity exports from 
open-access South to regulated North), with autarkic 𝑝2 = 𝑀𝐶2 > 𝑝1 = 𝐴𝐶1;  
ii. 𝕃2 > 𝕃1, with C2’s demand greater than C1’s and autarkic 𝑝2 = 𝑀𝐶2 > 𝑝1 = 𝐴𝐶1;  
iii. Open access prevails in both countries and C2’s demand is larger than C1’s (and intersects 
the 𝐴𝐶 curve at a point above A′ in Figure 2), with 𝑝2 = 𝐴𝐶2 > 𝑝1 = 𝐴𝐶1; 
iv. C2’s endowment of the NR is nil (its waters are polluted or otherwise inadequate for 
aquaculture, or it lacks the type of soil needed for a specific crop), with 𝑄2 = 0; 
v. C1 is a small open economy and takes as given the world price, 𝑝∗, which intersects the 𝐴𝐶 
curve above C1’s autarkic price (above 𝑃𝐴
′  in Figure 2), i.e., 𝑝∗ > 𝑝1; and  
vi. Open access prevails in both countries and C2’s externality parameter 𝛽2 > 𝛽1, with 𝑄2𝑇 <
𝑄1𝑇 and 𝑝2 = 𝐴𝐶2 > 𝑝1 = 𝐴𝐶1 
Four of the six cases above are examined below.  
4.2.1 Open access in C1 and C2, with 𝕃2 > 𝕃1  
As depicted in Figure 2, demand is given by 𝐷 in C1 and 𝐷′ in C2. Under autarky, equilibrium is at 
point 𝐴 in C1 and 𝐴′ in C2. Under trade, price is 𝑃𝑇
′ , and C1’s excess supply equals C2’s excess demand 
(𝐿𝑅̅̅̅̅ = 𝑅𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ ). C1’s welfare declines with trade, from 𝑍𝐴𝑃𝐴 to 𝑍𝐿𝑃𝑇
′  or by 𝑃𝑇
′ 𝐿𝐴𝑃𝐴 (as does its NR), and 
C2’s welfare increases by 𝑃𝐴
′𝐴′𝑇𝑃𝑇
′ .24 Thus, under open access, trade reduces (raises) a commodity 
exporter’s (importer’s) welfare. Also, though 𝑁2 < 𝑁1 and 𝑈2 < 𝑈1 under autarky, both are equalized 
under trade (𝑁2𝑇 = 𝑁1𝑇, 𝑈2𝑇 = 𝑈1𝑇). Also, 𝑁1 + 𝑁2 = 𝑁1𝑇 + 𝑁2𝑇, i.e., global NR is unchanged and 
𝑈2𝑇 = 𝑈1𝑇, with trade resulting in a larger global output (𝑄𝑇
𝑆 > 𝑄𝑆) and higher global (population-
weighted) welfare (𝑈𝑇 > 𝑈).
25 In the case where C1’s demand, 𝐷, intersects the 𝐴𝐶 curve above point 
𝑉, with the solution in the SC segment of the 𝐴𝐶 curve. 
                                                     
24 Though Figure 2 shows aggregate welfare 𝑊2𝑇 > 𝑊1𝑇, our interest is in the representative individual’s welfare, and with 
𝕃2 > 𝕃1, we have 𝑈2 < 𝑈1 and 𝑈2𝑇 = 𝑈1𝑇 . This is shown in footnote 25.  
25 Utility is 𝑈𝑖 =
1
2
𝑁𝑖
1/2 =
1
2
(𝛼 − 𝛽
𝕃i
2
)
1/2
 under autarky (i = 1, 2), with 𝑁1 > 𝑁2 and 𝑈1 > 𝑈2 as 𝕃2 > 𝕃1. Under trade, 
𝑝𝑇 =
1
𝛼−𝛽𝐿1𝑇
=
1
𝛼−𝛽𝐿2𝑇
, i.e., 𝐿1𝑇 = 𝐿2𝑇, and 𝑄𝑇
𝑆 = 𝑄1𝑇
𝑆 + 𝑄2𝑇
𝑆 = 2𝐿1𝑇(𝛼 − 𝛽𝐿1𝑇), 𝑝𝑇 =
𝑀𝑖𝑇
𝐷
𝑄𝑖𝑇
𝐷 , i.e., 𝑝𝑇𝑄𝑖𝑇
𝐷 = 𝑀𝑖𝑇
𝐷 , and 
𝑝𝑇𝑄𝑖𝑇
𝐷 + 𝑀𝑖𝑇
𝐷 = 𝕃i. Thus, 𝑝𝑇𝑄𝑖𝑇
𝐷 = 𝑀𝑖𝑇
𝐷 = 𝕃i/2. With 𝑄𝑇
𝐷 = 𝑄1𝑇
𝐷 + 𝑄2𝑇
𝐷 = 𝑄𝑇
𝑆, we have 𝑝𝑇𝑄𝑇
𝐷 = 𝑝𝑇𝑄𝑇
𝑆 =
𝑄𝑇
𝑆
𝛼−𝛽𝐿1𝑇
= 2𝐿1𝑇. 
Given that  𝑝𝑇𝑄𝑇
𝐷 = 𝑝𝑇(𝑄1𝑇
𝐷 + 𝑄2𝑇
𝐷 ) =
𝕃1
2
+
 𝕃2
2
≡ ?̅?, we have 2𝐿1𝑇 = ?̅?, or 𝐿𝑖𝑇 =
?̅? 
2
, i.e., 𝑄𝑖𝑇
𝑆 =
?̅? 
2
(𝛼 − 𝛽
?̅? 
2
). As 𝑄𝑖𝑇
𝐷 =
𝑀𝑖𝑇
𝐷
𝑝𝑇
=
𝕃i
2
(𝛼 − 𝛽𝐿1𝑇), we have 𝑄𝑖𝑇
𝐷 = 
𝕃i
2
(𝛼 − 𝛽
?̅? 
2
). Thus, 𝑄𝑖𝑇
𝑋 ≡ 𝑄𝑖𝑇
𝑆 − 𝑄𝑖𝑇
𝐷 = (
?̅? 
2
−
𝕃i
2
) (𝛼 − 𝛽
?̅? 
2
). As 𝕃2 > 𝕃1, we have 
𝕃1 < ?̅? < 𝕃2 and 𝑄2𝑇
𝑋 < 0 < 𝑄1𝑇
𝑋 , so C1 (C2) exports 𝑄 (𝑀). As 𝑚𝑖
𝐷 = .5 and 𝑞𝑖𝑇
𝐷 = 
1
2
(𝛼 − 𝛽
?̅? 
2
), we have 𝑈1𝑇 = 𝑈2𝑇 =
1
2
(𝛼 − 𝛽
?̅?
2
)
.5
< 𝑈1 and 𝑁1𝑇 = 𝑁2𝑇 = 𝛼 − 𝛽
?̅? 
2
< 𝑁1. Also, 𝑈2𝑇 > 𝑈2 and 𝑁2𝑇 > 𝑁2, with 𝑁1𝑇 + 𝑁2𝑇 = 𝑁1 + 𝑁2 = 2𝛼 −
𝛽?̅?: global NR is identical under autarky and trade. With 𝑠𝑖 ≡
𝕃i
𝕃1+𝕃2
, 𝑠1 + 𝑠2 = 1, 𝑠2 > 𝑠1, we have 𝑁𝑖𝑇 > 𝑠1𝑁1 + 𝑠2𝑁2. 
Thus, 𝑈𝑇 = 𝑠1𝑈1𝑇 + 𝑠2𝑈2𝑇 =
1
2
(𝛼 − 𝛽
?̅?
2
)
.5
> 𝑈 = 𝑠1𝑈1 + 𝑠2𝑈2 =
𝑠1
2
𝑁1
1/2 +
𝑠2
2
𝑁2
1/2 =
𝑠1
2
(𝛼 − 𝛽
𝕃1
2
)
1/2
+
𝑠2
2
(𝛼 −
𝛽
𝕃2
2
)
1/2
, with the result due to concavity and to 𝑁𝑖𝑇 > 𝑠1𝑁1 + 𝑠2𝑁2 [as 𝑁𝑖𝑇 = (𝑁1 + 𝑁2)/2 while 𝑠1 < 𝑠2 and 𝑁1 > 𝑁2, 
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A necessary (sufficient) condition for a SC equilibrium under trade is that it prevails at least in C2 
(in both C1 and C2) under autarky. In the latter case, demand 𝐷 in C1 intersects the 𝐴𝐶 curve above 
point 𝑉. Trade raises global welfare, reduces (raises) NR in C1 (C2), and improves NR’s international 
allocation.  
4.2.2 C1 is open access and C2 is regulated, with 𝕃2 > 𝕃1  
Under trade,  𝑝𝑇 =
1
𝛼−𝛽𝐿1𝑇
=
1
𝛼−2𝛽𝐿2𝑇
, i.e., 𝐿1𝑇 = 2𝐿2𝑇. The solution for 𝐿1𝑇 is  
 
𝐿1𝑇 =
1
5𝛽
[3𝛼 + 𝛽(𝕃1 + 𝕃2) − √9𝛼2 + 𝛽2(𝕃1 + 𝕃2)
2 − 4𝛼𝛽(𝕃1 + 𝕃2)],
26   (8)  
a special case of which is equation (7).  
Super congestion occurs for 𝕃1 > 13.33. Then, ∆′𝑈1𝑇 = −22.0 percent for 𝕃1 = 14 and ∆′𝑈1𝑇 =
−11.6 percent for 𝕃1 = 16. In both cases, 𝐴𝐶1 < 𝑀𝐶2 under autarky, so that C1 exports 𝑄. C2 exports 
𝑀 and gains from trade.  
4.2.3 C2 specializes in the production of 𝑀  
In this case, C1 exports 𝑄 and imports 𝑀. Trade raises 𝑄’s relative price – or C1’s terms of trade, 
resulting in a reduction in its welfare and NR, and an increase in C2’s welfare. Interestingly, the fact that 
C2 specializes in the production of 𝑀 leads C1 to specialize in the production of 𝑄, with 𝑀2
𝑆 = 𝕃 and 
𝐿1𝑇 = 𝕃. 
27  
4.2.4 Open access in C1 and C2, with greater negative externality in C2  
In this case, 𝛽2 > 𝛽1, with 𝑁1 > 𝑁2, 𝑄1 > 𝑄2, and 𝑈1 > 𝑈2 under autarky, and 𝑁1𝑇 = 𝑁2𝑇 ,  𝑄1𝑇 = 𝑄2𝑇 
and 𝑈1𝑇 = 𝑈2𝑇 under trade, and global 𝑁 > 𝑁𝑇, 𝑄 > 𝑄𝑇, and 𝑈 > 𝑈𝑇.
28 Thus, trade raises global NR, 
                                                     
i.e., the larger (smaller) weight multiplies the smaller (larger) NR stock]. Thus, trade raises global welfare and equalizes it 
internationally.  
26 Under trade, 𝑝𝑇 =
1
𝛼−𝛽𝐿1𝑇
=
1
𝛼−2𝛽𝐿2𝑇
, i.e., 𝐿1𝑇 = 2𝐿2𝑇. Thus, 𝑄𝑇
𝑆 = 𝑄1𝑇
𝑆 + 𝑄2𝑇
𝑆 = 𝐿1𝑇(𝛼 − 𝛽𝐿1𝑇) +
𝐿1𝑇
2
(𝛼 − 𝛽
𝐿1𝑇
2
) =
𝐿1𝑇(1.5𝛼 − 1.25𝛽𝐿1𝑇). From footnote 25, we have 𝑝𝑇𝑄𝑖𝑇
𝐷 =
𝕃i
2
. As 𝑝𝑇𝑄
𝐷 = 𝑝𝑇𝑄𝑇
𝑆, we have 
𝕃1+𝕃2
2
=
𝐿1𝑇(1.5𝛼−1.25𝛽𝐿1𝑇)
𝛼−𝛽𝐿1𝑇
, 
from which we obtain equation (8).  
27 Total output 𝑄𝑆𝑇 = 𝑄1𝑆 = 𝐿1𝑇. As in fn. 22 and 25, 
𝑚𝑖𝐷
𝑞𝑖𝐷
=
𝑀𝑖𝐷
𝑄𝑖𝐷
= 𝑝𝑇 (𝑖 = 1, 2), 𝑀𝑖𝐷 = 𝑝𝑇𝑄𝑖𝐷, 𝑀𝑖𝐷 + 𝑝𝑇𝑄𝑖𝐷 = 𝕃, 𝑀𝑖𝐷 =
𝑝𝑇𝑄𝑖𝐷 =
𝕃
2
 and 𝑚𝑖𝐷 =
1
2
. Thus, 𝑄𝑖𝐷 = 
𝕃
2𝑝𝑇
= 
𝕃
2
(𝛼 −  𝛽𝐿1𝑇). Also 𝑄1𝐷 = 𝑄2𝐷 =
𝑄𝑆𝑇
2
, so 𝑄𝑖𝐷 =
𝐿1𝑇
2
(𝛼 − 𝛽𝐿1𝑇), i.e., 𝐿1𝑇 =
𝕃. Thus, C1 specializes in the production of 𝑄, with 𝑄1𝑆 = 𝕃(𝛼 −  𝛽𝕃), 𝑞1𝑆 = 𝛼 –  𝛽𝕃, and 𝑞𝑖𝐷 =
1
2
(𝛼 −  𝛽𝕃). Thus, 
𝑈𝑖𝑇 = 𝑚𝑖𝐷
1/2𝑞𝑖𝐷
1/2 =
1
2
(𝛼 −  𝛽𝕃)1/2. Under autarky, 𝑈1 =
1
2
(𝛼 −  
𝛽𝕃
2
)
1/2
, i.e., C1’s welfare declines because NR falls 
from 𝑁1 = 𝛼 −  
𝛽𝕃
2
  to 𝑁1𝑇 = 𝛼 −  𝛽𝕃. And C2 gains from trade, with 𝑈2 = 0 under autarky (as 𝑞2𝐷 = 𝑞2𝑆 = 0) and 
𝑈2𝑇 =
1
2
(𝛼 −  𝛽𝕃)1/2 under trade.  
28 Assume 𝛽2 = 𝜆𝛽1, 𝜆 > 1. With open access for C1 and C2, 𝑝𝑇 =
1
𝛼−𝛽1𝐿1𝑇
=
1
𝛼−𝛽2𝐿2𝑇
, i.e., 𝛽1𝐿1𝑇 = 𝛽2𝐿2𝑇 = 𝜆𝛽1𝐿1𝑇 . Thus, 
𝐿1𝑇 = 𝜆𝐿2𝑇, and 𝑄𝑇
𝑆 = 𝑄1𝑇
𝑆 + 𝑄2𝑇
𝑆 = 𝐿1𝑇(𝛼 − 𝛽1𝐿1𝑇) + 𝐿2𝑇(𝛼 − 𝛽2𝐿2𝑇) = (1 + 𝜆)𝑄2𝑇
𝑆 = (1 + 𝜆)𝐿2𝑇(𝛼 − 𝛽2𝐿2𝑇). As in 
fn. 27, 𝑀𝑖𝑇
𝐷 + 𝑝𝑇𝑄𝑖𝑇
𝐷 = 𝕃, 𝑀𝑖𝑇
𝐷 = 𝑝𝑇𝑄𝑖𝑇
𝐷 =
𝕃
2
, and 𝑚𝑖𝑇
𝐷 =
1
2
, 𝑖 = 1, 2. Also, 𝑄𝑇
𝐷 = 𝑄1𝑇
𝐷 + 𝑄2𝑇
𝐷 = 2𝑄1𝑇
𝐷 = 𝑄𝑇
𝑆, and 2𝑝𝑇𝑄1𝑇
𝐷 = 
𝑝𝑇𝑄𝑇
𝑆 = (1 + 𝜆)𝐿2𝑇. Since 2𝑝𝑇𝑄1𝐷 = 𝕃, we have 𝐿2𝑇 =
𝕃
1+ 𝜆
 and 𝐿1𝑇 =
𝜆𝕃
1+ 𝜆
. Thus, 𝑄𝑇
𝑆 = 𝕃(𝛼 − 𝛽2𝐿2𝑇) and 𝑄𝑖𝑇
𝐷 =
𝑄𝑇
𝑆
2
=
𝕃
2
(𝛼 − 𝛽2𝐿2𝑇) =
𝕃
2
(𝛼 − 𝛽1𝐿1𝑇). C1 exports commodity 𝑄 since 𝑄1𝑇
𝑋 = 𝑄1𝑇
𝑆 − 𝑄1𝑇
𝐷 = (
𝜆𝕃
1+ 𝜆
−
𝕃
2
) (𝛼 − 𝛽1𝐿1𝑇) > 0 as 
𝜆
1+ 𝜆
−
1
2
=
𝜆 −1
2(1+ 𝜆)
> 0. Under autarky, 𝑈1 = 
1
2
(𝛼 −  
𝛽1𝕃
2
)
1/2
> 𝑈2 = 
1
2
(𝛼 −  
𝜆𝛽1𝕃
2
)
1/2
, with 𝑈𝑖𝑇 = 
1
2
(𝛼 −  
𝜆𝛽1𝕃
1+ 𝜆
)
1/2
; 𝑁1 =
𝛼 − 
𝛽1𝕃
2
> 𝑁1𝑇 = 𝛼 − 
𝜆𝛽1𝕃
1 + 𝜆
; 𝑁2 = 𝛼 − 
𝜆𝛽1𝕃
2
< 𝑁2𝑇 =  𝛼 −
𝜆𝛽1𝕃
1+ 𝜆
; 𝑁 =  𝑁1 + 𝑁2 = 2𝛼 − (1 + 𝜆)
𝛽1𝕃
2
< 𝑁𝑇 =  𝑁1𝑇 +
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output and welfare, and equalizes them internationally, with C1 (C2) exporting 𝑄(𝑀) to C2 (C1), with 
a decline (rise) in NR and welfare in C1 (C2), and C1’s greatest NR and welfare loss occurring under 
SC. 
5. Application to other issues  
 
The model developed in this paper is relevant to other cases of congestion of natural resources, man-
made resources, or other. One case is urban road transport (e.g., Vickery 1969, Small and Verhoef 2007). 
As Wolshon and Pande (2016) state, there are three fundamental variables in traffic engineering: the 
number of trips per unit of time or output, 𝑄; the number of cars per unit of distance or car density at a 
given moment in time, 𝐿; and car speed, 𝑁(𝐿), 𝑁′ < 0. The quality or productivity of the resource, i.e., 
the road, is the speed individuals are able to travel on it.  
Though Thomps (1998) states that “… the backward-sloping part of the supply curve … is usually 
referred to in the literature as ‘unstable’ and ignored as irrelevant ...,” the fact is that, as with aquaculture, 
car density may reach a point where a one percent increase in the number of cars on the road at a moment 
in time, 𝐿, reduces speed by one percent, with output unchanged and equal to its maximum level 𝑄 = ?̂?, 
with 𝐿 = ?̂? (see Section 2.1). Then, a further increase in density – e.g., to the level at peak demand time 
– would reduce output.  
A fire in a closed environment is another case of negative congestion externality. As more people try 
to escape from a fire, the time needed to do so increases and may reach a point where the number of 
people who manage to escape per unit of time declines, especially if panic erupts. No tax system exists 
that will ameliorate a problem that is (perceived to be) one of life or death. On the other hand, optimal 
regulation, including regular fire drills where people practice exiting a building in an orderly manner, is 
likely to be useful. This is applicable to other emergency situations where congestion externalities are 
present (e.g., evacuating a sinking ship).  
A similar situation relates to shopping in a limited space, say, a supermarket or department store. An 
increase in the number of shoppers has two opposite effects on sales: it raises total sales for a given level 
of sales per shopper, but the greater congestion reduces shoppers’ purchases per unit of time. Thus, a 
congestion level exists – below the level where nobody can move – in which total sales per unit of time 
fall as the number of shoppers increases, with optimal intervention raising (reducing) output under SC 
(HC). 
The analysis is also relevant for countries with monopoly power on the world commodity market. 
The negative externality of open access consists of the negative impact of these countries’ exports on 
the world price, their ‘natural resource’ consists of their international monopoly power, with small-scale 
growers’ marginal revenue 𝑀𝑅 equal to price 𝑝 and the countries’ 𝑀𝑅 < 𝑝. The monopoly’s value is 
equal to the (present value of the) difference between welfare under optimal intervention (e.g., an export 
tax) and in its absence. The backward-bending segment of the exports’ foreign exchange revenue is 
reached at the point where 𝑀𝑅 < 0. Absence of optimal intervention would drive the value of the 
country’s monopoly resource to zero. This issue is also related to the literature on immiserizing growth 
(Bhagwati 1958, 1969) though the latter does not hinge on 𝑀𝑅 being necessarily negative.  
 
                                                     
𝑁2𝑇  =  2𝛼 −
2𝜆𝛽1𝕃
1+𝜆
 because 
1+𝜆
2
−
2𝜆
1+𝜆
=
(𝜆−1)2
2(1+𝜆)
> 0. Also, 𝑄𝑆 =
𝕃
2
(𝛼 − 𝛽1
𝕃
2
) + 
𝕃
2
(𝛼 − 𝜆𝛽1
𝕃
2
) =
𝕃
2
[2𝛼 − (1 + 𝜆)𝛽1
𝕃
2
]. 
Thus, 𝑄𝑇
𝑆 − 𝑄𝑆 =
1+𝜆
4
𝛽1𝕃
2 −
𝜆
1+𝜆
𝛽1𝕃
2 > 0, as 
1+𝜆
4
−
𝜆
1+𝜆
=
(𝜆−1)2
4(1+𝜆)
> 0. Finally, with 𝑈𝑖 = 
1
2
𝑁𝑖
1/2 and 𝑈𝑖𝑇 = 
1
2
𝑁𝑖𝑇
1/2, it 
follows that 𝑈𝑇 = 𝑈1𝑇 + 𝑈2𝑇 > 𝑈 = 𝑈1 + 𝑈2 because 𝑁𝑇 > 𝑁 and because of the concavity of the utility function. Thus, 
trade under SC (as well as under LC and HC) raises global NR and welfare, and equalizes NR and welfare across the two 
countries.  
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6. Policy Implications  
Given the significantly greater welfare cost of open access under high congestion (HC) and especially 
under super congestion (SC), it follows that in countries where HC or SC prevails, regulating the use of 
the NR would generate gains that are massively larger than found in standard analyses which have dealt 
with the low-congestion (LC) case.  
Such a tax may be hard to levy because of administrative, logistical, enforcement and/or other 
reasons, more so in developing countries, and especially in remote areas where it is difficult to ascertain 
the importance of these externalities and/or collect the tax, particularly in the case of small fish farms. 
Other regulations – as found in developed countries such as Norway and Scotland – designed to 
minimize these externalities are also likely to be needed, including those regarding the number of 
licenses allocated, their geographic distribution, selection of qualified applications in accordance with 
prioritization criteria, etc.29 Assuming most of the output is exported, it may be optimal to tax exports 
as the latter is much easier to collect as export points (ports, roads, airports) are limited in number and 
more easily accessible.  
Producers are likely to favor a rise in the sector’s terms of trade and so are the authorities, given the 
increase in employment – often in remote areas where alternatives are limited – and in foreign exchange 
revenues. However, the country’s welfare will decline following a terms of trade increase in the absence 
of regulation. Thus, an increase in demand raises the importance of a sound, enforceable regulatory 
framework in order to ensure that the country benefits from the higher prices.  
7. Concluding Comments 
This paper examined the potential impact on output, variable input use, natural resource and welfare of 
an industry – such as aquaculture – that is based on the exploitation of a natural or other resource where 
negative congestion externalities play a dominant role. The analysis was conducted under both autarky 
and trade, and compared outcomes in the case of a common-property resource whose access is open, 
with the case where it is optimally regulated. This issue is of great importance in a number of developing 
countries, particularly those characterized by high congestion due to low endowment, high demand or 
both.  
The paper showed that 
- The welfare cost of open access under high (HC) and especially under super congestion (SC) is 
a multiple or orders of magnitude larger than under low congestion (LC) – the case typically 
examined – and results in a massive waste of resources;  
- An optimal tax raises price and reduces output under autarky in the case of LC and HC but 
reduces price and raises output under SC, 
- A terms-of-trade improvement reduces welfare in an open-access exporting country C1 and 
reduces its natural resource, NR; 
- Trade between open-access C1 and regulated but otherwise identical C2 reduces welfare and 
NR in C1 under LC or HC and raises welfare and NR under SC;  
- Trade between open-access C1 and a non-producing C2 always reduces C1’s welfare and NR; 
                                                     
29 Among other regulations, Norwegian authorities must provide a risk assessment of disease spread in an aquaculture facility 
and the surrounding environment, including the distance to watercourses and other aquaculture facilities; the type of species 
to be produced; the farming system and production volume, before giving a license. Also, any license proposal must be 
made public by the local authorities in the municipality where the farm is to be located and must be published in two local 
newspapers, allowing the local population to react to the proposal. And an applicant must also obtain a waste discharge 
permit in order to obtain a license and must provide monthly reports on various aspects of the farm’s operation and impact.  
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- A reduction in NR endowment reduces welfare and worsens trade’s impact for an exporting 
country;  
- C1’s welfare falls with the variable input (labor) level;  
- Output and welfare rise with a production tax in an open-access country under SC, and vice 
versa in the case of a production subsidy. 
The possibility of being on the HC or SC segment of the supply curve raises the importance of the 
optimal management of aquaculture or other industries that are based on the exploitation of an open-
access common-property renewable natural resource.  
Moreover, producers favor an increase in the price of their product and so does the government, 
given the positive impact on employment and foreign exchange revenue. However, the government 
should be aware that the need for a sound, enforceable regulatory framework increases with price 
because an increase in price in the case of open access results in a decline in welfare, particularly under 
SC.  
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Appendix  
I. Production tax  
Denote the tax rate by 𝜏, with 𝑝 = (1 +  𝜏)𝑝𝜏, where 𝑝𝜏 is the producer price. The solution for 𝐿𝜏 is 
𝐿𝜏 =
𝕃
2 + 𝜏
< 𝐿 =
𝕃
2
,30 i.e., the tax reduces 𝐿𝜏. This raises (reduces) output and reduces (raises) price 𝑝 
under SC (LC). The tax raises 𝐴𝐶. Under SC, it intersects demand curve 𝐷′ in Figure 1 at a point such 
as 𝐴1 or 𝐴0, i.e., at a higher output. The impact of 𝜏 under HC is more complicated. For instance, an 
infinitesimal increase in 𝜏 raises output. However, the opposite occurs under the optimal tax, as shown 
below.  
 
The optimal production tax, 𝜏∗, is 𝜏∗ =
𝑀𝐶−𝐴𝐶
𝐴𝐶
. Thus:  
 
𝜏∗ =
1
𝛼
[√(𝛼 − 𝛽𝕃)2 + 𝛼𝛽𝕃 −  (𝛼 − 𝛽𝕃)].31        (1A) 
 
The optimal tax 𝜏∗ raises average cost from 𝐴𝐶 =
1
𝛼−𝛽𝐿
 to 𝐴𝐶𝜏 = 
1 + 𝜏∗
𝛼−𝛽𝐿
. Under SC, the tax results in an 
𝐴𝐶 curve (in Figure 1) that intersects the demand curve 𝐷′ at point 𝐸′, i.e., it raises output. The optimal 
tax, 𝜏∗ = 𝐸′𝐼′/𝐼′𝑄1
′ , raises output from 𝑄0 to 𝑄1
′ . On the other hand, 𝜏∗ reduces output under LC and 
HC. The optimum is characterized by 𝑀𝑃𝐿 = 𝛼 − 2𝛽𝐿
∗ > 0, or 𝐿∗ <
𝛼
2𝛽
= ?̂?, ∀𝕃, i.e., the optimum is 
always in the LC segment of the 𝐴𝐶 curve. With 𝛼 = 10 and 𝛽 = 1, 𝐿∗ <
𝛼
2𝛽
= 5, ∀𝕃, which implies 
𝑁∗ = 𝛼 − 𝛽𝐿∗ > 5.  
 
Values of 𝕃 and the corresponding values for 𝜏∗ are presented in Table 1A, with 𝜏19
∗  for 𝕃 = 19 equal 
to 255 percent or 47.2 times 𝜏19
∗ . LC prevails for 𝕃 equal to 1, 4 and 9, with 𝜏∗ equal to . 054, .272 and 
. 854, respectively. HC prevails for 𝕃 =11 (𝜏∗ = 1.154) and SC prevails for 𝕃 of 16 (𝜏∗ = 2.00) and 19 
(𝜏∗ = 2.55). Thus, the value of 𝜏∗ for 𝕃 = 16 (19) is 37 (47.2) times the value for 𝕃 = 1, 7.4 (9.4) times 
the value for 𝕃 = 4, and 3 (2.3) times the value for 𝕃 = 9. 
  
                                                     
30 The consumer price 𝑝 =
𝑈𝑞
𝑈𝑚
= 
𝑚
𝑞
= 
𝑀
𝑄
=
𝕃−𝐿𝜏
𝐿𝜏(𝛼−𝛽𝐿𝜏)
. With a producer price 𝑝𝜏 and tax rate 𝜏, the consumer price 𝑝 = (1 +
 𝜏)𝑝𝜏. Under open access, 𝑝𝜏 = 𝐴𝐶 =
1
𝛼−𝛽𝐿𝜏
. Thus, = 
1 + 𝜏
𝛼−𝛽𝐿𝜏
=
𝕃−𝐿𝜏
𝐿𝜏(𝛼−𝛽𝐿𝜏)
, or 𝐿𝜏 =
𝕃
2 + 𝜏
.  
31 The optimal tax 𝜏∗ =
𝑀𝐶
𝐴𝐶
− 1 =
𝛼−𝛽𝐿∗
𝛼−2𝛽𝐿∗
− 1 =
𝛽𝐿∗
𝛼−2𝛽𝐿∗
. With 𝐿∗ =
𝕃
2 + 𝜏∗ 
, we have 𝜏∗ = 
𝛽𝕃
(2 +𝜏∗)𝛼 − 2𝛽𝕃
, or 𝛼𝜏∗
2
+
2(𝛼 − 𝛽𝕃)𝜏∗ − 𝛽𝕃 = 0, whose solution is equation (1A).  
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Table 1A. Optimal Tax Rate 𝝉∗(in %) 
𝕃     𝐀.   𝝉∗(𝛼 = 10, 𝛽 = 1) 
B.  𝝉∗(𝛼 = 5, 𝛽 = 1) = 𝝉∗(𝛼 = 10, 𝛽 = 2) 
A.                                   B. 
𝝉∗(𝕃)/𝝉∗(1) 
 
A.                     B. 
1        5.40                               11.7       1                        1 
4       27.2                               71.7                           5.0                      6.1 
9       85.4                               236     15.8                    20.2 
11       115                                   21.4                      
16       200                                   37.0                       
19       255                                   47.2                      
 
Under LC (SC), the central value of 𝕃 is 5 (16.667), and that of 𝜏∗ = 36.6 (212) percent. Thus, the 
average value of 𝜏∗ under SC is 5.8 times the value under LC.  
 
From (6), 𝜏∗ can be written as a function of 𝛽/𝛼. 32 Hence, a change in 𝛼 has the same impact on 𝜏∗ as 
a change in 𝛽 as long as the impact on 𝛽/𝛼 is the same, e.g., a reduction in 𝛼 from 10 to 5, or an increase 
in 𝛽 from 1 to 2, have the same impact on 𝜏∗.  
II. Robustness simulations  
This section provides derivations, tables and detailed descriptions of the results provided in Section 3.4 
which examines the robustness of the results obtained in Section 3.3 by using different values for the 
parameters of the production and utility functions, as well as different functional forms for them.  
1. Parameter values for 𝜶 and 𝜷 
The case of 𝛼 = 6, 𝛽 = 1 is examined in Panel A (where 𝕃 < 12) and 𝛼 = 2, 𝛽 = 1 (where 𝕃 < 4) in 
Panel B. In Panel A, the welfare (NR) loss ∇𝑈11 (∇𝑁11) for 𝕃 = 11 is equal to 55 (86) percent or 162 
(210) times ∇𝑈1 (∇𝑁1) for 𝕃 = 1, 107 (45) times ∇𝑈2 (∇𝑁2), 53 (18) times ∇𝑈3 (∇𝑁3), 8.3 (3.4) times 
∇𝑈6 (∇𝑁6) and 2 (1.5) times ∇𝑈9 (∇𝑁9). 
  
                                                     
32 Equation (6) can also be written as 𝜏∗ = √(1 − (
𝛽
𝛼
) 𝕃)
2
+ (
𝛽
𝛼
) 𝕃   −  (1 − (
𝛽
𝛼
) 𝕃). 
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Table 2A. Autarky: Open Access vs. Optimum 
 
A: 𝛼 = 6, 𝛽 = 1 
 
 
𝕃 
Open Access 
  𝐿         𝑁         𝑄           𝑈 
Optimum 
  𝐿∗        𝑁∗       𝑄∗       𝑈∗ 
Difference: 
𝑥−𝑥∗
𝑥∗
 (in %) 
∇𝐿      ∇𝑁     ∇𝑄         ∇𝑈 
  1  .50      5.5       2.8       1.173 .49       5.5       2.6      1.177  2.7    -.41      2.5       -.339 
  2  1.0      5.0       5.0       1.118 .90      5.1     4.6     1.124 11     -1.9      8.7       -.516 
  3  1.5      4.5       6.8       1.061 1.3       4.7       6.0      1.072 19     -4.9     13.3      -1.04 
  6  3.0      3.0       9.0        .866 2.0      4.0     8.0       .928 50      -25     12.5      -6.65   
 9  4.5      1.5       6.8        .612 2.4      3.6     8.6       .839 91      -59    -21.4      -27.0 
11  5.5      .50       2.8        .350 2.5      3.5     8.8       .784 112    -86     -69        -54.9 
 
 
B: 𝛼 = 2, 𝛽 = 1 
 
 
𝕃 
Open Access 
  𝐿         𝑁        𝑄        𝑈 
Optimum 
  𝐿∗        𝑁∗      𝑄∗      𝑈∗ 
Difference: 
𝑥−𝑥∗
𝑥∗
 (in %) 
∇𝐿      ∇𝑁     ∇𝑄      ∇𝑈 
  1 .50      1.5      .75      .6124 .42      1.6     .67      .6204   18     -4.9     13      -1.6 
  3 1.5      .50      .75      .3536 .78      1.2     .95      .4845  91     -59     -21      -27 
 
For the average value of ∇𝑈 by congestion category, we have ∇𝑈𝑆𝐶  (∇𝑈𝐻𝐶) = −41 (−7.2), or 66.5 
(11.7) times ∇𝑈𝐿𝐶 = −.617.  
 
Similarly, for the average NR, ∇𝑁𝑆𝐶  (∇𝑁𝐻𝐶) = −71 (−28) or 29.6 (11.7)∇𝑁𝐿𝐶 = −2.4.  
3. Alternative utility functions 
The robustness of the results is examined here under two alternative utility functions.  
𝐴. The first utility function specified is (a constant-relative-risk-aversion utility function) 𝑈(𝑥) =
𝑥1−𝜇
1−𝜇
, 
𝜇 ≠ 1 (with 𝑈(𝑥) = log(𝑥) for 𝜇 = 1). Assuming separability and 𝜇 ≠ 1, 𝑈(𝑚, 𝑞) = 𝑈(𝑚) + 𝑈(𝑞) =
𝑚1−𝜇
1−𝜇
+
𝑞1−𝜇
1−𝜇
. With 𝜇 = 1/2, we have:  
 
𝑈 =
𝑚1/2
1/2
+
𝑞1/2
1/2
.           (2A) 
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Maximizing utility implies that the ratio of marginal utilities equals the commodity’s relative price, i.e., 
(
𝑚
𝑞
)
1/2
= (
𝑀
𝑄
)
1/2
= [
𝕃−𝐿
𝐿(𝛼−𝛽𝐿)
]
1/2
= 𝑝. Under open access, 𝑝 = 𝐴𝐶 = 1
𝛼−𝛽𝐿
. The equation is 
rewritten as 𝛽𝐿2 − (1 + 𝛼 + 𝛽𝕃)𝐿 +𝛼𝕃 = 0, 33 with the solution being: 
  
𝐿 =
1
2𝛽
(1 + 𝛼 + 𝛽𝕃 − √(1 + 𝛼 + 𝛽𝕃)2 − 4𝛼𝛽𝕃).      (3A) 
 
At the optimum, 𝑝 = [
𝕃−𝐿
𝐿(𝛼−𝛽𝐿)
]
1/2
= 𝑀𝐶 =
1
𝛼−2𝛽𝐿
, or 
𝕃−𝐿
𝐿(𝛼−𝛽𝐿)
=
1
(𝛼−2𝛽𝐿)2
, a cubic equation that is 
rewritten as: 
 
4𝛽2𝐿3 − 𝛽(1 + 4𝛼 + 4𝛽𝕃)𝐿2 + 𝛼(1 + 𝛼 + 4𝛽𝕃)𝐿 − 𝛼2𝕃 = 0.     (4A) 
 
Simulation results for 𝛽 = 1 are presented in Table 3A, with 𝛼 = 6 in Panel A and 𝛼 = 4 in Panel B.  
 
In Panel A, 𝛼 = 6. LC prevails for 𝕃 = 1 and 𝕃 = 3. For 𝕃 = 1, the welfare impact of open access is 
∇𝑈𝐿 ≡
𝑈𝐿𝐶−𝑈𝐿𝐶
∗
𝑈𝐿𝐶
∗  = −.19 percent, and the NR impact is ∇𝑁𝐿 =
𝑁𝐿−𝑁𝐿
∗
𝑁𝐿
∗ = −.93. For 𝕃 = 3, the welfare 
impact of open access is ∇𝑈𝐿2 = −3.4 = 18∇𝑈𝐿, the NR impact is ∇𝑁𝐿2 = −14.9 = 16.1∇𝑁𝐿. The 
average for 𝕃 = 1 and 𝕃 = 3 is ∇𝑈𝐿𝐶 = −1.8 and ∇𝑁𝐿𝐶 = −7.9. 
 
HC prevails for 𝕃 = 5. In percent, ∇𝑈𝐻𝐶 = −9.0 = 47∇𝑈𝐿 = 5∇𝑈𝐿𝐶, and ∇𝑁𝐻𝐶 = −36.4 =
39∇𝑁𝐿 =5∇𝑁𝐿𝐶 . 
SC prevails for 𝕃 = 10 and 𝕃 = 50. For 𝕃 = 10, ∇𝑈𝑆𝐶 = −21.5 = 113∇𝑈𝐿 = 12∇𝑈𝐿𝐶, and ∇𝑁𝑆𝐶 =
−71.7 = 77∇𝑁𝐿 = 9.1∇𝑁𝐿𝐶. And for 𝕃 = 50, ∇𝑈𝑆𝐶2 = −23.7 = 125∇𝑈𝐿 = 13.2∇𝑈𝐿𝐶 and ∇𝑁𝑆𝐶 =
−95.9 = 103∇𝑁𝐿 = 12.1∇𝑁𝐿𝐶.  
 
With 𝕃 = 5 (10) (50), 𝐿 is 71 percent above (twice) (2.1 times) the optimum, with an impact on output 
of −5(−43)(−91) percent and an impact on NR of −51(−77)(−96) percent, amounting to a massive 
waste of resources. 
  
                                                     
33 Thus, [
𝕃−𝐿
𝐿(𝛼−𝛽𝐿)
]
1/2
=
1
𝛼−𝛽𝐿
 ⇒
𝕃−𝐿
𝐿(𝛼−𝛽𝐿)
=
1
(𝛼−𝛽𝐿)2
 ⇒
𝕃−𝐿
𝐿
= 
1
𝛼−𝛽𝐿
 ⇒ 𝛽𝐿2 − (1 + 𝛼 + 𝛽𝕃)𝐿 +𝛼𝕃 = 0. 
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Table 3A. Autarky: Open Access vs. Optimum 
 
Panel A: 𝛼 = 6, 𝛽 = 1 
 
𝕃 
Open Access 
  𝐿        𝑁         𝑄        𝑈 
Optimum 
  𝐿∗       𝑁∗       𝑄∗       𝑈∗ 
Difference: 
𝑥−𝑥∗
𝑥∗
 (in %) 
∇𝐿      ∇𝑁     ∇𝑄     ∇𝑈 
 1  .84      5.2      4.3      5.0 .79     5.2       4.1     5.01  6.1     -.93     5.1    -.19 
   3  2.4      3.6      8.6      4.3 1.8     4.2       7.5     4.45 33      -15      15     -3.4 
 5  3.6      2.4      8.6      3.7 2.1     3.9       8.3     4.1 71      -36     -5.1    -9.0   
10  5.0      1.0      5.0      2.8 2.5     3.5       8.7     3.6 103    -71     -43     -21 
50  5.9      .13      .78      2.1 2.8     3.2       9.0     2.8  111    -96     -91     -24   
 
 
Panel B: 𝛼 = 4, 𝛽 = 1 
 
 
𝕃 
Open Access 
  𝐿         𝑁        𝑄         𝑈 
Optimum 
  𝐿∗        𝑁∗       𝑄∗       𝑈∗ 
Difference: 
𝑥−𝑥∗
𝑥∗
 (in %) 
∇𝐿      ∇𝑁     ∇𝑄       ∇𝑈 
   1  .76      3.2      2.5       4.1 .68      3.3      2.3       4.1  13      -2.6     9.8     -.46 
   3  2.0      2.0      4.0       3.5 1.3      2.7      3.5       3.7 55      -26      14      -5.6 
 5  2.8      1.2      3.4       3.0 1.5      2.5      3.7       3.7 86      -51     -8.5     -12   
10  3.5      .53      1.8       2.5 1.7      2.3      3.9       3.1 109    -77     -53      -19 
50  3.9      .08      .33       2.1 1.9      2.1      4.0       2.6 112    -96     -92      -20 
 
 
In panel B, 𝛼 = 4 and 𝛽 = 1. LC prevails for 𝕃 = 1, the limit between LC and HC prevails for 𝕃 = 3 
(with ?̂? = 2), and SC prevails for 𝕃 ≥ 5. In percent, at 𝕃 = 1, ∇𝑈𝐿 = −.46 and ∇𝑁𝐿 = −2.6. At 𝕃 = 3, 
∇𝑈𝐿2 = −5.6 = 12.2∇𝑈𝐿 and ∇𝑁𝐿2 = −26.2 = 19∇𝑁𝐿 . At 𝕃 = 5, ∇𝑈𝑆 = −12.3 = 25.5∇𝑈𝐿  and 
∇𝑁𝑆 = −50.9 = 19.6∇𝑁𝐿. At 𝕃 = 10, ∇𝑈𝑆2 = −19.3 = 42∇𝑈𝐿  and ∇𝑁𝑆2 = 78.0 = 30∇𝑁𝐿. At 𝕃 =
50, ∇𝑈𝑆3 = −20.2 = 44∇𝑈𝐿  and ∇𝑁𝑆3 = −96.8 = 37∇𝑁𝐿.  
 
As with the original utility function in (2), the welfare losses under SC are a multiple of those under LC 
or are of a greater order of magnitude.  
 
𝐵. A second alternative utility function used here as a second check on the results is:  
 
𝑈 = (𝑚 −
𝑚2
2
) + (𝑞 −
𝑞2
2
) , 𝑚 =
𝑀
𝕃
, 𝑞 =
𝑄
𝕃
.      (5A)  
 
Utility maximization implies that 𝑝 =
𝑈𝑞
𝑈𝑚
=
1−𝑞
1−𝑚
. With 𝑀 = 𝑙 = 𝕃 − 𝐿, 𝑚 = 1 −
𝐿
𝕃
, and 1 − 𝑚 =
𝐿
𝕃
. 
Thus, 𝑝 = 
1−𝑞
𝐿/𝕃
=
(𝕃−𝑄)
𝐿
= 
𝕃
𝐿
− (𝛼 − 𝛽𝐿).  
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Open Access: 
Competitive producers using an open-access NR as input select output where 𝑝 = 𝐴𝐶, i.e., 𝑝 =
1
𝛼−𝐿
. 
Thus, 𝕃 − 𝐿(𝛼 − 𝛽𝐿) =
𝐿
𝛼−𝛽𝐿
, a cubic equation in 𝐿, namely:  
 
𝛽2𝐿3 − 2𝛼𝛽𝐿2 + (1 + 𝛼2 + 𝛽𝕃)𝐿 − 𝛼𝕃 = 0.     (6A) 
 
Optimum: 
At the optimum, price 𝑝 = 𝑀𝐶, i.e., 
𝕃
𝐿
− (𝛼 − 𝛽𝐿) =
1
𝛼−2𝛽𝐿
. Thus, we have:  
𝛽2𝐿3 −
3𝛼𝛽
2
𝐿2 +
1
2
(1 + 𝛼2 + 2𝛽𝕃)𝐿 −
𝛼𝕃
2
= 0.     (7A) 
 
Under open access, for 𝛼 = 2 and 𝛽 = 1, we have 𝐿3 − 4𝐿2 + (5 + 𝕃)𝐿 − 𝛼𝕃 = 0.  
For 𝕃 = 1, the solution is 𝐿𝐿 = .4563, a LC case, 𝑁𝐿 = 1.544 and 𝑚𝐿 = .544. Thus, 𝑚𝐿 −
𝑚𝐿
2
2
=
.396. Also, 𝑞 = .704 and 𝑞 −
𝑞2
2
= .456. Thus, 𝑈𝐿𝐶 = .8522.  
 
For the optimum, we have 𝐿3 − 3𝐿2 + (5 + 2𝕃)𝐿 − 𝕃 = 0, with 𝐿𝐿
∗ = .410, 𝑁𝐿
∗ = 1.590, 𝑞∗ = .652, 
and 𝑞∗ −
(𝑞∗)2
2
= .440; 𝑀∗ = 𝑚∗ = .590, 𝑚∗ −
(𝑚∗)2
2
= .416 and 𝑈𝐿
∗ = .8555 = 𝑈𝐿 + .0033. The 
welfare impact of open access is ∇𝑈𝐿 = −
.0033
.8555
= −.00375 or a loss of .375 percent. The impact on NR 
quality is ∇𝑁𝐿 = −2.90 percent.  
 
For 𝕃 = 5, 𝐿3 − 4𝐿2 + 10𝐿 − 10 = 0. Under open access, 𝐿𝑆 = 1.629, 𝑁𝑆 = .371, 𝑄𝑆 = .604, 𝑞𝑆 =
.121, 𝑀𝑆 = 3.371, 𝑚𝑆 = .674, and 𝑈𝑆 = .560. At the optimum, 𝐿
3 − 3𝐿2 + 15𝐿 − 5 = 0, 𝐿𝑆
∗ =
.356, 𝑁𝑆
∗ = 1.644, 𝑄𝑆
∗ = .585, 𝑀𝑆
∗ = 4.644, and 𝑈𝑆
∗ = .608 = 𝑈𝑆𝐶 + .048. Thus, in percent, ∇𝑈𝑆 =
−100 (
.048
.608
) = −7.77 = 20.7∇𝑈𝐿, and ∇𝑁𝑆 = −77.5 = 26.7∇𝑁𝐿. Thus, the welfare (NR) cost under 
𝕃 = 5 is over 20 (26) times that under 𝕃 = 1.  
 
For 𝕃 = 10, 𝐿𝑆2 = 1.8, 𝑁𝑆2 = .2, 𝑈𝑆2 = .519, 𝐿𝑆2
∗ = .95, 𝑁𝑆2
∗ = 1.05, 𝑈𝑆2
∗ = .590 and, in percent, 
∇𝑈𝑆𝐶2 = −12.1 = 32.1∇𝑈𝐿𝐶, and ∇𝑁𝑆𝐶2 = −81 = 28∇𝑁𝐿𝐶. Thus, the welfare (NR) cost under 𝕃 = 10 
is 32 (28) times that under 𝕃 = 1. 
 
As with the original utility function in (2), the welfare losses under SC are a multiple of the losses under 
LC or are of a different order of magnitude.  
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